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Taxation without Information:  
The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax Collection 
 
 
Wei Cui* 
 
Abstract: A prominent strand of recent economic and legal scholarship hypothesizes that third-
party information reporting (TPIR) is essential to modern tax collection. The slogan, “no taxation 
without information,” has captured researchers’ imagination and is even often presented as self-
evident truth. This Article offers a fundamentally different perspective, arguing that the emphasis 
on TPIR is misplaced. TPIR is used largely in the collection of the personal income tax but not of 
many other types of modern taxes. Even for the personal income tax, TPIR also has close 
substitutes which do not involve information transmission to the government. Theoretically, 
appeals to TPIR are vitiated by the puzzle of payor compliance. And most purported empirical 
evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR fails to provide causal identification.  
I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations of modern tax collection, 
we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal intermediaries” in a game of deterrence against 
tax evaders. Instead, it would be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of social cooperation 
under the rule of law. The co-evolution of the business firm and modern regulatory law may have 
enabled modern governments to practice precisely “taxation without information”. 
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Introduction 
 
Successfully raising tax revenue is a defining mark of the “state capacity” of advanced 
economies.1 Building effective tax administration is one of the most urgent tasks facing the 
poorer countries of the world in their pursuit of sustainable development.2 These ideas have 
recently fueled extraordinary policy initiatives among many nations, as well as become the focus 
of cutting-edge research in political economy, public economics, economic history, and related 
branches of the social sciences.3 In 2015, the one hundred and ninety three United Nations (UN) 
Member States reached two comprehensive agreements, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda4 and 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.5 Both agendas committed “to enhancing revenue 
administration through modernized, progressive tax systems, improved tax policy and more 
efficient tax collection…[and in particular to] strengthen international cooperation to support 
                                                 
1 See Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics, 99 
AM. ECON. REV. 1218 (2009) and sources cited in note 1 therein; Mark Dincecco, The Rise of Effective States in 
Europe, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 901 (2015) (“effective” states “have the extractive capacity to gather enough revenues, 
and the productive capacity to better channel public funds”).  For the thesis that modern “state capacity” helps to 
explain the divergent paths of economic development of nations, see generally TIMOTHY BESLEY & TORSTEN 
PERSSON, PILLARS OF PROSPERITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT CLUSTERS (2011); Daron 
Acemoglu, Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States, 52 J. MONETARY ECON. 1199 (2005); Pranab 
Bardhan, State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 862 
(2016). 
2 See generally, Michael Keen, Taxation and Development—Again (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
12/220, 2012); Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization: Improving Tax Compliance, INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (2015), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/020215a.pdf. Press Release, United 
Nations, Countries Reach Historic Agreement to Generate Financing for New Sustainable Development Agenda 
(July 15, 2015) (“significant additional domestic public resources…will be critical to realizing sustainable 
development and achieving the sustainable development goals”). 
3 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, 
and Growth in Historical Perspective, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1167 (2000); Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Taxation 
and Development, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 51 (A. J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2013); Henrik J. Kleven et 
al., Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries, 83 
ECONOMICA 219 (2016) [hereinafter KKS]; Dincecco, supra note 1. 
4 United Nations (UN), Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development , DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/frameworks/addisababaactionagenda.  
5 UN, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, DIVISION FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 
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efforts to build capacity in developing countries.”6 A slew of major international projects were 
launched on the sidelines of the Addis Ababa Conference and in its aftermath, involving the 
coordination of international organizations that previously operated separately in this policy 
area.7 In the meantime, questions such as “Why do developing countries tax so little?” and “How 
can developed countries tax so much?” now draw the attention of some of the most innovative 
and influential social scientists.8 These intellectual developments can be seen as complementary 
to the global policy initiatives: if raising tax revenue is indeed crucial to the path to prosperity for 
all nations in the world, a framework for understanding the institutional foundations of modern 
tax collection is clearly in order.  
 
Much of the recent, highly prominent social science research on the underpinnings of the 
tax collection capacity of advanced economies has converged on a simple, seemingly obvious 
line of reasoning. To collect tax, the government needs information about the taxable income, 
transactions, and other tax attributes of taxpayers. But the government is always in a situation of 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers: the latter always have incentives to hide such 
information. The government’s ability to overcome such information asymmetry therefore must 
be crucial for tax collection. And, scholars seem to believe, the most powerful way by which 
such asymmetry has been overcome is through third-party information reporting.9 In the boldest 
                                                 
6 UN, supra note 4, Article 22.  
7 For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) launched the Tax Inspectors Without Borders project to “help developing 
countries bolster domestic revenues…by strengthening their tax audit capacities.” Press Release, United Nations, 
Tax Inspectors without Borders: OECD and UNDP to work with developing countries to make tax audits more 
effective, (July 13, 2015). Moreover, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) also launched a 
new initiative to help developing countries strengthen their tax systems. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank and the IMF Launch Joint Initiative to Support Developing Countries in Strengthening Tax Systems 
(July 10, 2015). The organization International Tax Compact launched The Addis Tax Initiative, in which over 30 
countries and international organizations teamed up to strengthen international cooperation in strengthening tax 
administration, and in which participants commit to “collectively double their technical cooperation in the area of 
domestic resource mobilization by 2020.” Press Release, International Tax Compact, On the occasion of the launch 
of the ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE, (July 15, 2015). In October 2016, the second meeting of the signatories of the 
Addis Tax Initiative was held in Paris, France. The meeting finalized the Work Plan for 2016/17, outlining the key 
priorities of the Addis Tax Initiative. Addis Tax Initiative, 2nd Meeting of the Signatories of the Addis Tax Initiative, 
Paris, France, ADDIS TAX INITIATIVE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/#slider-2.] More recently, 
the OECD, IMF, WB and UN announced “The Platform for Collaboration on Tax”: see IMF et al., The Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax: Concept Note (Working Paper, 2016), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pdf/pr16176.pdf. A report was prepared for the G20 Finance Ministers 
in the framework of the Platform for Collaboration on Tax: see IMF ET AL., ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN BUILDING TAX CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-external-support-in-building-tax-capacity-in-developing-
countries.pdf. 
8 KKS, supra note 3; Henrik J. Kleven, How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much? 28 J. ECON. PERSPECT 77 (2014); 
Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little? 28 J. ECON. PERSPECT 99 (2014). 
9 As the author of one widely-cited study that purports to provide empirical support for this intuitive reasoning puts 
it:  
“A fundamental constraint for taxation is that governments need to be able to observe transactions 
in order to impose a tax on them. A growing literature therefore argues that understanding 
information flows is central to effective taxation. When governments imperfectly observe 
transactions, important differences emerge between forms of taxation that are equivalent in 
standard models of taxation but differ in the information they generate for the government. Third-
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formulation of this idea, Henrik Kleven, Claus Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez claim that third-
party information reporting is a defining feature of modern taxation.10 In other words, 
mechanisms for transmitting taxpayer information to the government represent the institutional 
foundations of modern tax collection. To support this bold conjecture, a small but “rapidly 
growing” empirical literature11 has emerged that claims to offer novel evidence for the power of 
third-party information reporting (“TPIR”).12 The slogan, “no taxation without information”, not 
only has captured researchers’ imagination but is often even presented as self-evident truth.13  
 
Indeed, to many U.S. scholars and policymakers, this claim may seem quite familiar. U.S. 
policymakers, for example, have long been interested in narrowing the “tax gap”, i.e. the 
discrepancy between the tax revenue that is collected and the revenue that ought to be 
collected.14 And greater information report has often been considered as a key approach to 
achieving this goal.15 Although whether the scope of information reporting should be expanded 
has been a matter of century-long debates,16 important legislative actions taken in 2009 have 
given greater emphasis to TPIR.17 Since 2011, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has required 
credit card companies and payment settlement entities such as eBay to report payments made to 
                                                 
party reporting, verifiable paper trails, and whistle-blowers are thought to play an important role in 
facilitating tax enforcement.” 
Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax, 105 
AM. ECON. REV. 2539 (2015) (citations omitted). 
10 KKS, supra note 3. See Part I infra.   
11 The description of this empirical literature as “rapidly growing” is borrowed from Joel Slemrod et al., Does 
Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax Compliance? 149 Journal of Public Economics 1–
19 (2017), discussed in detail in Part III infra. For a summary review, see Joel Slemrod, Tax Compliance and 
Enforcement: New Research and its Policy Implications s.3.3 (Ross School of Business, Paper No. 1302, 2016). For 
examples of some widely cited studies, see Pomeranz, supra note 9; Henrik J. Kleven, et al, Unwilling or Unable to 
Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651 (2011); Carrillo et al., Dodging 
the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED 
ECONOMICS (forthcoming); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors (London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Working Paper, 2016); and Miguel Almunia & David Lopez-Rodriguez, Under the Radar: The Effect of 
Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance (Warwick Economics Research, Paper Series No. 1070, 2015).  
12 In this Article, I will use “information reporting,” “third-party reporting”, and TPIR interchangeably. 
13 Pomeranz, supra note 9.  
14 See, e.g., Understanding the Tax Gap, IRS.GOV (July. 16, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-the-Tax-
Gap. 
15 Both the economic and legal literatures on tax compliance in the United States are very large and not possible to 
review here. For recent legal scholarship, see, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the 
Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted? 78 FORDHAM LAW REV. 1733 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, 
Reducing Information Gaps]; Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STANFORD LAW REV. 695 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps]; Joseph 
Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506 (2007).   
16 See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative Practice”: Social 
Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 144 (2016); Anuj C. Desai, What a 
History of Withholding Tells Us About The Relationship Between Statutes and Constitutional Law, 108 NW. U. L. 
REV. 859 (2014); Joseph J. Thorndike, Wall Street, Washington, and the Business of Information Reporting, TAX 
HISTORY PROJECT (Feb. 13, 2006), 
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/cf7c9c870b600b9585256df80075b9dd/a518ae7d8d5eaf23852571360068
fc5e?opendocument.  
17 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, § 403; Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3091(e), 122 Stat. 2654, 2911. 
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individuals and businesses.18 Financial institutions are also now under the obligation to furnish 
information about the tax basis of securities to taxpayers and the government to determine gains 
or losses on the sale of securities.19 Proposals to further expand TPIR continue to be advanced.20 
Most importantly, the ever-expanding computing capacities of modern digital economies make 
the recording and transmission of transactional information to tax collectors easier and easier, 
which in turn seems to promise more effective government control of taxpayer information.21   
 
This Article contributes to these vibrant intellectual and policy discussions by offering a 
fundamentally different perspective. Much recent scholarship, I argue, has mischaracterized the 
role of information reporting, which has also led to increasing confusions about the institutional 
basis of modern tax collection. To develop this perspective, I first engage in a de-bunking 
exercise, aimed at exposing weaknesses in the arguments and evidence adduced for the 
importance of TPIR. I show that TPIR is largely used in the collection of the personal income 
tax, and plays no role in most other types of modern taxes.22 Moreover, although information 
reporting and withholding are crucial to the collection of the personal income tax, to portray 
them as overcoming pre-existing information asymmetries between the government and 
taxpayers relies on legal artifices.23 I also show that the emphasis on TPIR leaves it mysterious 
why payors specifically, and business organizations generally, would comply with the tax law.24 
In particular, the prevalent belief that payor withholding or information reporting generates self-
enforcing compliance dynamics is both practically unconvincing and theoretically naïve. Finally, 
most purported evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR is based on flawed empirical inferences.25  
 
These de-bunking arguments demonstrate that TPIR cannot play the explanatory role that 
social scientists have assigned it: at least until the present, giving governments effective access to 
taxpayer information through third parties does not explain the success of modern tax 
administration. The arguments highlight previously neglected weaknesses in an apparent 
scholarly consensus: what many social scientists are increasingly coming to use as “stylized 
facts” (to motivate further theorizing and empirical work) actually involve grave misconceptions 
about the basis of modern tax administration. This is the first major contribution of the Article. 
 
In a second set of arguments, I articulate a new way of looking at the feasibility of TPIR, 
in terms of when information about the mutual identities of market participants is likely to be 
transmitted through market mechanisms. This perspective defines the limits of TPIR more 
sharply and parsimoniously than previous approaches, and suggests that TPIR will tend to be 
                                                 
18 Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6050W. See Part III below for a discussion of empirical literature analyzing the 
impact of credit card and third-party settlement entity reporting; see also Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax 
Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56 (2017).  
19 I.R.C. § 6045(g). 
20 James Alm & Jay A. Soled, Improving Tax Basis Reporting for Passthrough Entities, 145 TAX NOTES 809 (2014). 
21 James Alm & Jay A. Soled, Whither the Tax Gap? (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/James%20Alm%20and%20Jay%20Soled.pdf; Kleven, 
supra note 8, at 81 (“the gradual transition from cash to credit card transactions may eventually eliminate most tax 
evasion even for self-employed individuals.”) 
22 See Part I infra. 
23 See Part II.A infra. 
24 See Part II.B infra. 
25 See Part II.C infra. 
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incomplete with respect to business income.26 I illustrate this perspective through an important 
recent study of the effect of TPIR by credit card companies on U.S. taxpayers,27 and, drawing on 
the same study, provide an explanation of how the incompleteness of TPIR renders it an 
ineffective tool in limiting tax evasion. This is the second major contribution of the Article.28 
 
Finally, I suggest that to better understand the institutional foundations of modern tax 
collection, we should stop thinking of business firms as “fiscal intermediaries” in a game of 
deterrence against tax evaders. Instead, it would be more fruitful to conceive of firms as sites of 
social cooperation under the rule of law. If firms enable social cooperation, but do so only with 
the support of a legal system, then compliance with law in business operations can often be 
expected. There need not be anything special about compliance with tax law in particular, and 
any valid explanation of why firms comply with the tax law is unlikely to be distinct from 
explanations of the phenomenon of business compliance with the law in general.29 I argue that 
this explanatory strategy is more consistent with the history of modern taxation—in particular, 
the fact that labor and workplace regulations were implemented well before the adoption of 
information reporting—than explaining tax compliance in terms of TPIR. The third major 
contribution of the article is thus to put tax compliance into the context of business compliance 
with the law in general, and connecting both with the theory of the firm.  
 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents some important historical facts that have 
emboldened economists to hypothesize that TPIR is the linchpin of modern taxation. It then 
contrasts this bold hypothesis with a much more cautious view, which holds TPIR to be a 
derivative phenomenon. Part II offers a series of arguments for the latter view, identifying 
weaknesses in both the conceptual arguments and empirical evidence for the relevance of TPIR. 
Part III sets out a new theory about the limitation of information reporting, and shows how this 
theory is consistent with recent empirical evidence from the U.S. on the limited impact of TPIR. 
Parts IV and V then contrasts the conceptions of firms as “fiscal intermediaries” and as sites of 
social cooperation. Part IV highlights the inadequacies of the former. Part V sketches out the 
latter conception and its promise both in terms of historical plausibility and theoretical 
coherence. Part VI briefly discusses some of the policy implications of the arguments in Parts I-
V. A brief Conclusion then follows. 
I. Information Reporting: The Linchpin of Modern Taxation?  
 
Political economists who view taxation as a core component of modern state capacity 
emphasize that richer countries tax more, and any given country tends to tax more as it gets 
richer.30 In a recent, influential paper, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (abbreviated below as “KKS”) 
show that these patterns are driven entirely by countries’ adoption of what they call “modern 
taxes”. They include in the definition of “modern taxes” personal and corporate income taxes, 
                                                 
26 See Part III.A infra.  
27 See Part III.B infra. 
28 See Part III.C infra. 
29 See Part V infra. 
30 KKS, supra note 3, at 1; Besley & Persson, supra note 3, at 56; Besley & Persson, supra note 8, at 102-03; 
Kleven, supra note 8, at 77-78.  
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the value-added tax (VAT), and payroll taxes and social security contributions. By contrast, 
“traditional taxes” are defined as all other taxes, including property taxes, inheritance taxes, 
excise and sales taxes, custom duties, etc. Examining data from 2005 regarding 29 OECD 
countries and 43 non-OECD countries, they show that there exists a clear positive correlation 
between (i) GDP per capita and (ii) the ratio of revenue from modern taxes to GDP, but there is 
no correlation between GDP per capita and the ratio of revenue to GDP from traditional taxes31 
(see Figure 1 below). Further, using data for 14 advanced economies over a 160-year time 
horizon, they show that again, the growth in tax revenue in these countries over time is driven 
entirely by growth in “modern taxes”, with no long-run increase (and typically a weak decline) in 
“traditional taxes” (see Figure 2 below).  
 
Figure 1: Correlations between GDP and Revenue from “Modern” and “Traditional” Taxes32  
 
 
KKS offer an interpretation for these historical patterns that has gained great popularity 
among political economists studying tax administration.33 They postulate that in any country, the 
growth of tax revenue is constrained by the enforceability of taxes, which depends on the 
availability of taxpayer information to the government. All “modern taxes” are basically taxes in 
respect of which the “enforceability constraint” has been loosened or overcome, through the 
mechanism of “third-party reporting”. By this latter term, KKS mean arrangements whereby 
firms act as intermediaries to collect information about other taxpayers and transmit such 
information to the government.34 They argue that when firms get sufficiently large, they are 
more likely to act reliably as such intermediaries, because the risk of firms’ being caught 
                                                 
31 KKS, supra note 3, at 7 (thus “the relationship between taxes and development across countries is driven by a 
stark variation in tax structure across countries.” Emphasis in the original) 
32 Source: id., at 224.   
33 See sources cited in note 11 supra.  
34 This thesis is also advanced in Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory, 96 
AM. ECON. REV. 130 (2006). 
8 
 
cheating increases as firm size grows.35 Therefore, roughly speaking, they present a picture 
where the growth of firm size in an economy causes “third-party reporting” to become more 
reliable, which in turn makes taxes more enforceable, and the optimal level of taxation more 
achievable.   
 
That large firms tend to be more compliant with the tax law (and other types of law) is an 
important, but not uncommon, observation.36 What KKS’s theory adds to such observation is the 
contention that this matters for the capacity of governments to collect tax revenue because it 
helps solve a pre-existing problem of information asymmetry, i.e. the government’s lack of 
information about ultimate taxpayers such as individual income-earners.37 
 
Figure 2: Revenue Composition over Time for Select Countries38  
 
 
 
Other scholars have recently offered explanations of modern tax compliance in a similar 
spirit. That is, they first postulate information asymmetry as the most important kind of 
enforceability constraint for taxes, and then identify exogenously given types of economic 
                                                 
35 See Part IV for a critique of this aspect of KKS.  
36 See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21. KKS show, using recent data from 50 countries, that tax revenue and share 
of workforce in large firms are positively correlated across countries. KKS, supra note 3, 8-9.  
37 KKS also provides a theory of why large firms are more compliant—in terms of the increasing risk of being 
exposed by whistle-blowers. Part IV infra argues, on the contrary, that many other explanations may be at play and 
are much more relevant. 
38 Source: id., at 225. KKS provide comparable historical information for other industrial economies in the Online 
Appendix to their article.  
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development that relax such constraint. For example, Anders Jensen claims that because 
economically more developed countries have larger sectors of formal employment, they are able 
to make greater use of TPIR (with respect to wage income), and therefore more successfully 
overcome the information asymmetry vis-à-vis taxpayers.39 Roger Gordon and Wei Li argue that 
since tax collection depends on audits and the effectiveness of audits depends on the existence of 
paper trails, the level of development of a country’s financial sector will substantially determine 
the country’s capacity of tax collection.40 
 
However, while the purported centrality of TPIR to modern tax compliance has become 
commonplace among many scholars, careful reflection suggests that the above evidence is 
actually consistent with opposite view, namely that the use of TPIR is quite limited in tax 
administration in advanced economies. To start, there is no obvious way in which the corporate 
income tax is enforced through TPIR. Corporations report income and deductions largely on the 
basis of their own accounting records. This is illustrated in the United States by regulatory rules 
that specifically exempt corporations from information reporting requirements that are applicable 
to payments to individuals: businesses that purchase services worth more than $600 a year from 
a service provider generally need to report such payments to the IRS, but not if the provider is a 
corporation.41 The same corporate exemption applies to the payment of interest and dividends.42  
 
The value added tax (VAT), which is a large source of revenue in most countries 
(although not in the U.S., which has not adopted a VAT), also does not involve information 
reporting.43 Under the VAT, firms—which are nominally the taxpayers—charge VAT on goods 
and services sold to other firms and to individuals, and firms engaged in businesses may claim 
tax credits for the VAT that they have been charged on input purchases.44 They then remit any 
net VAT amount—tax charged on sales minus input tax credits—to the government (hence the 
term “value added”). However, firms generally do not transmit information about payments to 
and specific transactions with vendors and customers to the government, but instead aggregate 
transaction information into lines on simple tax returns.45  
 
 The prevalence of TPIR is really most pronounced in the individual income tax context, 
and only for wage and passive investment income. U.S. workers, for example, receive W-2 
                                                 
39 Anders Jensen, Employment Structure and the Rise of the Modern Tax System (unpublished working paper, 2015), 
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/sem2016/jobmarket/jmp_jensen.pdf.  
40 Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation, 93 
J. PUBLIC ECON. 855 (2009). Gordon and Li view financial institutions primarily as the depository of information to 
which the government may have access, rather than intermediaries that automatically transmit such information to 
the government. However, the literature on TPIR (cited in note 11 supra) has treated Gordon and Li’s work as 
reaching kindred conclusions. See Part IV below for a critique of conceptions of the firm both as intermediaries and 
as depositories of information.  
41 U.S. Treasury Regulations §1.6041-3(p)(1). 
42 U.S. Treasury Regulations §1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A) 
43 KKS acknowledge this point in a footnote (KKS, supra note 3, footnote 8), but refers to the fact that the VAT 
creates a paper trail. The existence of a paper trail does help audits, but it does not automatically provide the 
government with any information before an audit. See Alm & Soled 2016, supra note 21 (contrasting information 
reporting and audit).  
44 See ALAN SCHENK ET AL., VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (2d ed. 2015), Chapters 1-2.  
45 Id., Chapters 5-6. 
10 
 
forms each year from their employers regarding their wage income and the federal, state as well 
as social security taxes that have been withheld from such income. U.S. investors receive 1099 
forms regarding their dividend, interest, capital gain, and certain other types of passive 
investment income. Social security and pension payments, which one can also think of as forms 
of passive investment income, are subject to TPIR as well. These types of income represent a 
very substantial portion of the U.S. individual income tax base, and therefore TPIR may appear 
to be thoroughly built into the tax. But, in reality, that is not the case. The practical and political 
difficulties of extending information reporting beyond the contexts of employment and passive 
investment income are well-known.46 The most important examples of information reporting 
outside these contexts are the long-standing requirement to report business payments made to 
independent contractors providing services,47 and the much more recent requirements for credit 
card companies and other payment settlement entities to report sales settled by non-cash 
means.48 The effectiveness of these two types of information reporting is still controversial; Part 
III infra will specifically review recent empirical evidence for the (in)effectiveness of credit-card 
reporting. But few would disagree that TPIR with respect to individual business income is 
largely incomplete.49 
 
Overall, therefore, it is fair to say that TPIR is used very little in the corporate income 
tax, VAT, and the taxation of individual business income, while it is used with respect to 
individual’s wage and passive financial income. Even in the United States, which relies on the 
personal income tax for revenue to a much greater extent than other OECD countries,50 sales and 
property taxes and corporate income taxes (none of which generally relies on TPIR) generate 
about 36% of total government revenue.51 Another 24% of total government revenue comprises 
social security contributions, and as discussed in Part II.A, at least half of this revenue (and 
maybe the entirety of it) can be characterized as not involving TPIR.52 Thus emphasizing TPIR 
seems to privilege, without obvious justification, (certain elements of) the individual income tax. 
A more neutral characterization seems to be that it is business organizations that play essential 
roles in collecting all modern taxes: they are intermediaries (third parties) in respect of several 
types of taxable individual income, but are taxpayers in their own right in respect both of taxable 
individual business income and of other taxes. 
 
This, however, is not how scholars—not just economists but also legal scholars—have 
written about third-party reporting. 53 The standard view is that, first, TPIR is crucial for tax 
collection on wage and passive financial income, and second, the practical limitations on third-
                                                 
46 See sources cited in note 16 supra. See also, Joseph J. Thorndike, Do We Have a Tax Compliance Crisis in 
Washington?, TAX HISTORY PROJECT (Feb. 5, 2009), 
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/E6F441BC13E2989D852575590070ED95?OpenDocument; 
Joseph J. Thorndike, The Income Tax Is Inquisitorial -- Get Over It, TAX ANALYSTS (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.taxanalysts.org/tax-analysts-blog/income-tax-inquisitorial-get-over-it/2013/01/29/168416 
47 I.R.C. 6041(a). 
48 I.R.C. §6050W. 
49 See Bankman, supra note 15; Slemrod et al., supra note 11; Carrillo et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
50 OECD, Revenue Statistics 2016 - the United States, OECD (2016), https://www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-
united-states.pdf.  
51 Id. (computations based on 2013 and 2014 data). 
52 See text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.  
53 See Part III.A infra for the discussion of legal scholars’ views on TPIR. 
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party reporting for other types of (individual taxable) income may be overcome, when the cost of 
compliance can be sufficiently reduced. If this is correct, the present limitations of TPIR are a 
matter of mere detail, while the power of TPIR is the more basic “stylized fact” that is significant 
for social science.  
 
In the following two Parts, I argue against this standard view in two ways. Part II argues 
that TPIR is a derivative component in modern tax administration. Part III offers an explanation 
of why information reporting would generally not work outside the wage and passive investment 
income context. The explanation implies that there are hard limits to the completeness of 
information reporting, which in turn constrains its utility.  
II. Information Reporting as a Derivative Institution 
 
To properly evaluate the significance of TPIR, three basic facts, to which the existing 
literature has given inadequate attention, must be taken into account. First, where it is applied in 
modern tax collection, TPIR often has close substitutes that would not support the claim that tax 
collection is conditioned on the transmission of taxpayer information to the government. These 
substitutes show that the dependence of taxation on information transmission is an illusion. 
Second, the appeal to TPIR leaves it mysterious why payors would comply with reporting 
obligations instead of colluding with payees. Third, although some evidence for the effectiveness 
of TPIR is routinely cited, none of such evidence identifies the causal effect of TPIR on 
compliance.  
A. The illusion of information transmission 
 
The effective use of information reporting in the income tax context is observed mainly 
for wage and passive financial income. Reflection suggests that these components of the 
individual income tax base are distinctive in the following way: third parties—namely payors of 
wage, dividend, interest, etc.—possess both near-complete information about the specific items 
of income and control over their payment.54 But for any item of income such that there is a payor 
that possesses both complete information about it and control over its payment, information 
reporting is only one among several ways in which the government can collect tax.  
 
One clear alternative is final withholding. For example, under the final withholding 
systems adopted in many European countries today, employers simply deduct tax from wage 
payments, and employees would not have to file income tax returns themselves.55 Similarly, 
banks paying interest and corporations distributing dividends simply withhold tax on interest and 
dividend payments at flat rates, without the need for individual taxpayers to report the receipt of 
such payments.56 Under final withholding, even though the recipients of income are nominally 
                                                 
54 In Part II.D infra, I argue that it is specific economic conditions and legal conventions that enable the individual 
income tax base to be built from these types of income. 
55 For a comparative review of the practice of final withholding on wage income and financial income, see Return-
Free Tax Systems: Tax Simplification Is a Prerequisite, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (2003), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Return-Free-2003.pdf (hereinafter 
RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS);  
56 Id. at 2, 7. 
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the taxpayers, they generally have no compliance obligations in respect of the income subject to 
withholding. Any information transmitted to the government simply helps the latter to determine 
whether the payors have performed withholding correctly. In other words, third parties do not 
transmit information to the government in order to help the latter monitor the compliance of 
ultimate taxpayers.  
 
There is in fact a more complete substitute for information reporting. For any item of 
income that could be subject to final withholding, an equivalent tax can be imposed simply as an 
excise tax on the payer. In the U.S., a contemporary example of this is the “social security taxes” 
imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) portion of the Internal Revenue 
Code.57 Under the FICA tax regime, "taxes with respect to employment" consist of an "excise" 
tax on employers58 and an "income" tax on employees,59 each of which is a percentage of the 
employees' wages. While the income tax on employees is required to "be collected by the 
employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when 
paid,"60 the excise tax on employers is simply paid by employers themselves. However, from the 
perspectives of the employer and of the government, this distinction between the excise 
(employer) and withholding (employee) portions of Social Security contribution is merely 
nominal. They involve exactly the same calculations and remittance actions by the same parties, 
namely employers.61 It is also generally believed that they have the same economic incidence.62 
Thus although one can think of the withholding tax (the “employee portion”) as involving the 
reporting by a third party (i.e. the employer) on the taxable wage of an ultimate taxpayer (i.e. the 
employee), this characterization would not be applicable to the excise tax that is administered in 
an identical fashion. 
 
Indeed, the equivalence—from an enforcement perspective—between a final withholding 
tax and an excise tax on the payor featured prominently in the history of the U.S. tax system. The 
first U.S. withholding tax, enacted by the 1862 Revenue Act, was applicable to (i) the interest 
from railroad company bonds and the dividends from railroad company stock, (ii) dividends paid 
by banks, trust companies, savings institutions, and insurance companies, and (iii) salaries of 
federal government employees in excess of 600 dollars per year.63  The nominal taxpayers for 
the tax—the persons on whom the tax was imposed—were the payors, not the recipients, of 
interest, dividends and salaries.64 Therefore, whether to label the 1862 tax an excise tax on 
payors or an withholding tax on payees is a choice involving little substance. 65 
 
                                                 
57 I.R.C. §§3101-3128. 
58 I.R.C. §§3111-3113. 
59 I.R.C. §§3101-3102. 
60 I.R.C. §3102.  
61 Desai, supra note 16, at 894.  
62 See HARVEY ROSEN & TED GEYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 314-15 (8th ed. 2007). 
63 Desai, supra note 16, at 873-876.  
64 Id. at 874 (however, the payors of dividend and interest were "authorized and required" to "deduct and withhold 
from all payments made ... the said duty or sum." Id.) 
65 Because the nominal taxpayer were the payors themselves, the tax base of the withholding tax was not treated as 
part of the income of individual recipients. Id. at 875-76.  
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Even more tellingly, the Civil War dividends tax led to the proposal in 1894 of the first 
corporate income tax: because in the nineteenth century corporations generally distributed most 
of their earnings as dividends, the corporate income tax was little different form a tax on 
dividends.66 The corporate income tax, that is, was a mutation from a withholding tax on 
dividends. Although one could think of the corporate income tax as involving information 
reporting on shareholders, it is uncommon to literally refer to it as such.67 But this point also 
works the other way: although one does not usually think of social security withholding on wage 
earners as an excise tax on the employer, one certainly could, just as the Internal Revenue Code 
explicitly labels the portion of FICA taxes imposed on employers.  
 
The underlying point is this. Once a certain tax base is determined, whom the statute 
designates as the taxpayer, payor or recipient, is to a considerable extent a legal artifice.68 Where 
a “third party” possesses both complete information regarding an item of income belonging to 
the tax base and control over that item of income, then that third party can itself be made into the 
taxpayer with respect to such element of the tax base. There would be no need to provide 
information about a different taxpayer. If two taxes are enforced in the same way, but in terms of 
legal terminology there is a “third party” under one tax but no “third party” under the other tax, 
the “third party” aspect of the first way of enforcing tax is clearly superfluous.  
 
Just as importantly, consider the question why a government would choose, in connection 
with any item of income, information reporting with respect to the recipient rather than excise 
taxation with respect to the payor. The answer is generally that there is some personal 
circumstance—be it progressive tax rates that depend on the recipient’s total income (i.e. not just 
income from particular payments or payors), credits and deductions, personal expenses, and so 
                                                 
66 Id. at 882 (footnote 107) (“the concept of ‘withholding’ of the stockholder's income tax at source had taken a 
small step toward the creation of a new and distinct concept: the corporate income tax;” the tax on corporate income 
was “simply the Civil War dividends tax in a new guise”.) Also see generally STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO 
SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT (2010). 
67 Desai, supra note 16, at 882 (footnote 107) (“Although there was a clear sense that taxing the income of an 
individual owner of shares at the corporate level was primarily grounded on the increased likelihood of collecting 
the tax, the idea that a corporate income tax was simply a "withholding" of the shareholders' income eventually gave 
way.”) 
68 The equivalence between a withholding tax on the recipient of a payment and an excise tax on the payor is a well-
known aspect of tax design and has many illustrations not only in the U.S. but also in the tax systems of other 
countries. A contemporary example of a tax on wage income imposed on employers is the Australian fringe benefits 
tax, imposed on employers for in-kind compensation for employees. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, 
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2010), at Part II.B.1. Each of South Africa, 
Sweden, France, and Belgium has enacted taxes on corporations on their profit distributions that are the equivalent 
of withholding taxes on dividends. Johann Hattingh, South Africa - Corporate Taxation § 1.1.3, COUNTRY 
ANALYSES IBFD (June 1, 2016), http://online.ibfd.org/document/cta_za_s_1. Emma Nilsson, Sweden - Corporate 
Taxation § 6.1, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (April 1, 2016), http://online.ibfd.org/document/cta_se_s_6. Juliana 
Benamran, France - Corporate Taxation § 6.1, COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (July 21, 2016), 
http://online.ibfd.org/document/cta_fr_s_6. Gauthier Cruysmans, Belgium - Corporate Taxation § 6.1, COUNTRY 
ANALYSES IBFD (July 1, 2016), http://online.ibfd.org/document/cta_be_s_6. Brazil has enacted excise taxes on 
payors of royalties to replace withholding taxes with respect to royalty recipients. Fernando Tonanni & Bruno 
Gomes, Brazil - Corporate Taxation § 14.6.4., COUNTRY ANALYSES IBFD (March 1, 2016), 
http://online.ibfd.org/document/cta_br_s_14. 
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on—to which the payors do not have easy access.69 Therefore such private information would 
have to come from the recipients themselves. Insofar as such private information is not provided 
to the payors, excises or final withholding are not feasible, and accurate tax collection depends 
on compliance by the ultimate income recipients themselves. But this is just to say that the 
adoption of information reporting as opposed to withholding/excises is precisely premised upon 
the incompleteness of information possessed by payors (third parties), it is not a solution to the 
incompleteness of information held by the government.  
 
This point has ample illustrations both historically and comparatively. In the history of 
U.S. taxation, for instance, there were no progressive tax rates for the withholding/excise tax 
mechanisms under the 1862 Revenue Act.70 Conversely, progressive income tax rates were 
introduced under the 1913 Income Tax Act, which rendered the withholding provisions of the 
Act infeasible, and information reporting replaced it.71 A comparative study carried out by the 
U.S. Treasury Department showed that the extent to which a country’s income tax system takes 
into account individual taxpayer circumstances largely explains why some countries adopt final 
withholding for individual income while others do not.72  
 
In sum, information reporting becomes relevant only when the tax law permits private 
information to be relevant.  This undermines the pretense that there is some necessary, pre-
existing information asymmetry—for example, between the recipients of wages, salaries, and 
dividends, on the one hand, and the government, on the other—which information reporting 
reduces or overcomes. Such asymmetry comes into place only when the government has made 
the choice of giving information private to these recipients policy significance. Information 
asymmetries and information reporting are two sides of the same coin.  
B. The puzzle of payor compliance 
 
There is a different, more basic, reason why information reporting offers an inadequate 
explanation of compliance even in the context of taxing individual wage and financial income. 
An obvious question arises: what account for compliance on the part of the “third parties” that 
perform information reporting and/or withholding? What, for example, prevent employers from 
regularly colluding with employees in under-reporting wages, and bargaining with employees for 
the benefit of the tax savings from such underreporting?73  Such collusion is widespread today in 
developing countries.74 It is also prevalent in the informal sectors in developed countries: in the 
U.S., for example, the level of compliance with the “nanny tax” is perceived to be low and has 
remained so for many years.75 It is in fact quite visible even in the formal sectors of developed 
                                                 
69 See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 55.  
70 This was perceived to generate horizontal inequities among different taxpayers (because the income duty also 
imposed by the Act did contain progressive tax rates through exemptions). Desai, supra note 16, at 876-78. 
71 Id., at 884-88. 
72 See generally RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 55. 
73 See, e.g., Gideon Yaniv, Collaborated Employee-Employer Tax Evasion, 47 PUBLIC FINANC. 312 (1992).  
74 For a recent study, see Todd J. Kumler et al., Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax Compliance: 
Evidence from Mexico (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 19385, 2013). 
75 See Sue Shellenbarger, Family Secret: More Parents are Avoiding the Nanny Tax, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122583716191498477; Celeste Watkins-Hayes, The Immorality of Evading 
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countries: many employers and employees push the envelope on what counts as non-taxable 
fringe benefits, on the basis that the IRS is unlikely to conduct audits.76 Given that there are 
rarely other “third parties” monitoring the “third party” required to perform information 
reporting, why does the latter comply with tax law?   
 
A typical answer given to this question is that employers can claim deductions for wage 
payments, which lower the employer’s income tax liability. The employee and the employer thus 
have “adverse interests”, or “opposing incentives”, with respect to reporting wage payments: 
while the employee stands to lose from employer reporting, the employer gains from it. 
Information reporting is therefore “self-enforcing”.77 It is also often assumed that this reasoning 
applies to other types of payments.78  
 
While this answer may be plausible in certain contexts, it both lacks empirical generality 
and is theoretically naïve. In terms of empirical validity, the answer may seem to have appeal in 
the U.S., where personal income tax rates have been relatively low and the nominal corporate 
income tax rate high since the 1960s. Therefore employer’s wage deductions may often save 
more tax dollars than the tax liabilities of employees. However, even in the U.S., there are many 
situations where payments of income taxable to payees are not deductible or generate minimal 
benefits to payors: examples include non-deductible payments such as dividends and personal 
expenditures (e.g. childcare), and deductible payments made by payors subject to low or zero 
effective tax rates (e.g. due to losses, accelerated depreciation, and tax exemptions). Indeed, it is 
generally believed that the effective tax rate of U.S. corporations is far lower than the nominal 
tax rate,79 and may well be lower than the individual income tax rate applicable to many 
employees. And in many OECD countries, the effective tax rate applicable to wage income 
(especially when payroll taxes or social security contributions are considered) far exceeds the 
corporate income tax rate applicable to employers. Therefore the net potential tax saving from 
non-reporting of wage income is quite significant. 
 
Generally, holding information reporting to be self-enforcing is theoretically naïve 
because it assumes that the parties to the transactions (both the party that must declare income 
and the party that claim expense deductions) are subject to similar effective tax rates. But when 
this is the case, the government precisely collects no net revenue from the transaction: the 
                                                 
the Nanny Tax, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/the-
immorality-of-evading-the-nanny-tax/359637. 
76 JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 426 (16th ed. 2012); Yaniv, supra note 73, at 313. 
77 Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 15, at 729-30; Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 
15, at 1739, 1747, and 1751 (footnote 93). 
78 Payors are also subject to penalties for failing to withhold or report to the government. However, with low audit 
rates, the expected value of such penalties may be very low. While there are far fewer employers than employees in 
any economy, the number of employers is generally still too great for tax authorities realistically to maintain a high 
rate of audit coverage. Indeed, the audit rate for parties required to perform information reporting is not known to be 
higher than in other areas of tax administration. Therefore a high probability of detection through audits cannot be 
what explains payor compliance.  
79 See Yaniv, supra note 73, at 315 (citing a study showing that in 1982, the average effective tax rate of U.S. 
corporations was 13.1% when the statutory tax rate was 46%).  
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inclusion by the payee is cancelled by the deduction by the payor.80 It is when parties are not 
subject to the same tax rates that the government can collect net revenue from a transaction, but 
then, putting aside transaction costs and the failure to reach and maintain collusive bargains, the 
potential will always exist for the parties to collude and lower the net payment to the 
government. For instance, if employer’s corporate income tax rate is substantially higher than 
personal income tax rate applicable to wage recipients, an incentive arises for employers and 
employees to collude to over-report wage payments.  
 
This problem—the pervasive incentives for payor-payee collusion—is relevant even if 
final withholding, excise taxation, or any other alternative to information reporting is adopted. It 
is thus of fundamental significance in theorizing about compliance, and is taken seriously by 
theorists who rigorously model tax compliance.81  
C. Lack of causal identification  
 
The following fact is routinely touted as evidence for TPIR’s effectiveness of for 
securing compliance. In the U.S. and a number of other countries, tax administrators study the 
“tax gap” by conducting audits designed to precisely measure the compliance level of a 
representative sample of the population.82 Many of these studies have revealed that taxpayer 
compliance rate is much higher for wages and passive financial income than it is for self-
employment income.83 Since wage and passive financial income is usually subject to TPIR while 
self-employment income is not, it is argued, higher compliance is produced by TPIR.84 
 
Such inferences from correlation to causation are, however, highly unreliable. 
Specifically, it is rarely possible to disentangle the use of TPIR from two types of confounding 
factors, which may undermine both the internal and external validity of the inferences. These two 
factors are (a) the nature of the (individual) income and (b) the nature of the payor.  
 
Consider the first. As suggested in Part II.A supra (and as will be further elaborated in 
Part III infra), TPIR seems particularly tailored to wage and passive investment income. Yet 
governments can often secure compliance with tax collection with respect to these types of 
income without relying on TPIR. For example, most financial transactions create paper (or 
digital) trails, and such documentation trails, as opposed to TPIR, may induce compliance with 
respect to passive financial income. None of the studies purportedly demonstrating the 
                                                 
80 In other words, the irony of “self-enforcing” mechanisms is that the government can never expect to raise any net 
revenue where they operate. 
81 KKS, supra note 3, at 4; Yaniv, supra note 73.  
82 Mark D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax Compliance and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data Show? 
67 NATL TAX J. 531 (2014); Kleven et al, supra note 11.  
83 Phillips, supra note 82, at 232; Kleven et al, supra note 11, at 653; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STRATEGIC 
PLAN FY2014-2017 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3744.pdf, at 34;  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX 
GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf, at 5; 
Kleven, supra note 8, at 79-83. 
84 Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 37 (2007) (“Line item 
by line item, there is a clear positive correlation between the rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement 
mechanisms such as information reports and employer withholding.”) 
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effectiveness of TPIR, however, tries to distinguish the effect of TPIR from the effect of paper 
trails. Yet the distinction is important: a paper trail is useful only conditional on the 
government’s decision to audit taxpayers, while TPIR itself precisely would affect the making of 
that decision.  
 
Similarly, as argued earlier, tax can be effectively collected from wages and financial 
income through withholding or, equivalent administratively, payor excise taxation. There has 
been no study to show that TPIR is more effective than withholding or excise taxation (or, where 
withholding and information reporting are simultaneously implemented, that the latter is 
effective independently of the former.) This implies that no evidence has been produced that “but 
for” TPIR, the level compliance could not be as high as is actually observed.85   
 
Consider next the nature of the payor. In one study analyzing Danish taxpayer data, 
Henrik Kleven and co-authors found that after controlling for both whether an item of income is 
subject to TPIR and whether it is likely to be audited, the effect of firm size still has a significant 
impact on the rate of tax evasion. They infer from this that “collusion between taxpayers and 
third parties may be important in small firms” even in Denmark.86 This suggests that firm size 
may matter for compliance independently of the use of TPIR. By contrast, there has been no 
study investigating the distinct effect of TPIR while holding firm size constant.87  
 
Purported evidence for TPIR’s effectiveness that is not based on individual tax return 
data is even more problematic. For example, some point to the fact that economies with larger 
formal employment sectors have higher tax-to-GDP ratios.88 Yet these are likely to be economies 
with greater presence of large firms, which are responsible for paying for the bulk of wages. The 
compliance of such firms, as opposed to TPIR per se, may be the reason for the high level of 
observed compliance with respect to wage income. The fact that much tax revenue is collected 
through taxes not involving TPIR further weakens the credibility of claims about TPIR’s 
relevance. 
 
If there is causation in this area, it is more plausible to regard it as lying between the large 
tax base of wages and financial income in advanced economies, on the one hand, and the 
collection of revenue from such income, on the other. When a large wage and financial income 
tax base is absent, information reporting could have little use. But once such conventions are 
developed, other collection mechanisms such as final withholding or payor excise taxation may 
be deployed instead of information reporting. The differences among these different collection 
mechanisms do not map onto differences in enforcement and are merely nominal. Therefore the 
“third party” aspect of information reporting cannot constitute genuine causal mechanism. 
                                                 
85 Contrast this with the claim made in Kleven, supra note 8 (at 79), that it has been shown “empirically that tax 
enforcement is successful if and only if third-party information covers a large fraction of taxable income” (emphasis 
added).  
86 Kleven et al, supra note 11, at 676. 
87 This is no doubt partly due to the fact that the main studies testing the effectiveness of TPIR are based on 
individual taxpayer returns, and therefore can typically control only for the characteristics of the individual 
taxpayers.  
88 Kleven, supra note 8, at 81-3. 
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III. The Boundaries of Third-Party Reporting  
 
Scholars who hold information reporting to be essential to modern tax compliance also 
tend to express great optimism in information reporting’s future. To them, the benefits of 
information reporting are proven, and its cost can only go down.89 So far, I have questioned 
whether information reporting’s benefits have really been proven. In this Part, I suggest a new 
way of thinking about how the cost of TPIR determines its limits, i.e. why we find third-party 
reporting in some places and not others. Moreover, I discuss some strong evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of TPIR beyond its traditional spheres. 
A. Previous attempts at cost-benefit analyses of information reporting 
 
Legal scholars have previously attempted to articulate a framework for analyzing the 
costs and benefits of third-party reporting. Yet the predictive power of what they have suggested 
is limited. For example, Leandra Lederman has described six conditions which information 
reporting requirements should generally satisfy:90 
 
a) The party furnishing the information report should be at arm’s-length from, and should be 
unlikely to benefit from collusion with the taxpayer. 
b) Only those who possess a bookkeeping infrastructure should be required to information 
report.  
c) Information reporting parties should be fewer in number than taxpayers reported on, 
allowing the government to centralize the sources of information. 
d) “Information reporting is most effective when it provides all of the information necessary 
for the government to match the third-party report with corresponding amounts on the 
taxpayer's return; partial reporting reduces enforcement efficiency.”  
e) There should be few ways for the taxpayer to cheaply avoid information reporting.  
f) Transactions that do not contribute substantially to the tax gap in the absence of 
information reporting should not be prime targets for information reporting. 
 
It is not hard to see that the predictive power of these six factors is weak. Consider the 
idea that parties furnishing the information report “should be unlikely to benefit from 
collusion”.91 In reality, the potential for collusion among employers and employees to evade 
taxes (and for similar collusion among other arm’s length parties) is ever present.92 This has 
nonetheless not precluded employer information reporting from being adopted. Similarly, it is 
true that those required to information report generally possess a bookkeeping infrastructure, and 
are fewer in number than taxpayers reported on. But these two factors are equally present in 
contexts where third-party reporting is generally not adopted. Supermarkets and department 
stores possess bookkeeping infrastructures and are fewer in number than individual shoppers. 
Yet governments do not require retail stores to report the individual purchases made by shoppers 
(although stores may be asked to collect sales taxes). Finally, the principles that there should be 
limited opportunities for cheap avoidance, and that TPIR’s costs should be commensurate with 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 21.  
90 Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1739-41. 
91 Id. 
92 See Part II.B. 
19 
 
its benefits, clearly apply to legal design in general, and do not specifically explain the scope of 
third-party reporting.   
 
Factor (d) on Professor Lederman’s list, however, does imply a way of predicting the use 
of information reporting. When there is discrepancy between gross payment and taxable income, 
information reporting by the payor need to be structured to reconcile such discrepancies to be 
useful. For example, when brokers were only required to report proceeds from sales of securities 
to the IRS, without reporting the tax basis of the securities in respect of their owners, the 
information reported was only of limited utility.93 The requirement commencing in 2011 for 
brokers to report on the tax basis of securities thus illustrates a change from incomplete to more 
complete reporting on capital gain and loss.94 Conversely, as we will see through the extended 
discussion of recent credit card reporting in the U.S. below,95 when discrepancies between gross 
payment and taxable income cannot be reconciled, the utility of information reporting for the 
government is sharply reduced.96  
 
Other scholars have also noted the need for information reporting to be complete to be 
effective.97 However, when is information reporting likely to be incomplete? Little attention has 
been given to answering this question. I will now suggest an answer: information reporting is 
likely to be incomplete whenever the income-generating activity involves many market 
transactions from which agency relationships and financial claims are absent.  
B. Agency relationships, financial claims, and non-anonymity of transacting parties 
 
It appears that all instances of TPIR in the individual income taxation context involves 
either of or a combination of two kinds of relationships: (i) a relationship of agency, or (ii) a 
contractual relationship, especially one establishing a financial claim. For example, employment 
is an agency relationship. Financial income typically arises from financial claims, though in 
modern financial markets financial claims tend to be intermediated by layers of agency 
relationships.98  
 
Market transactions involving agency relationships and financial clams are distinctive in 
the following respect: they require mutual knowledge of the identities of the transacting parties.99 
It is the intrinsic nature of an agency relationship for the principal and agent to know who each 
                                                 
93 Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1743. 
94 See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1743.    
95 Part III.C infra. 
96 But information reporting may still serve purposes other than transmitting information to the government. See Part 
III.C infra. 
97 See Bankman, supra note 15; Slemrod et al., supra note 11; Paul Carrillo et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
98 For a recent discussion in the tax literature of such relationships, see Reid Thompson & David Weisbach, 
Attributes of Ownership, 67 TAX L. REV. 249 (2014). 
99 Government transfers such as low-income support or supplement income for the unemployed, which are often 
subject to information reporting and/or withholding, are also inherently non-anonymous. Some agency relationships 
and financial claims may nonetheless involve anonymity (e.g. the use of bearer instruments). So one may think of 
the presence of agency relationships and financial claims as generally necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
keeping of mutual identities. 
20 
 
other are. Similarly, financial claims by definition persist over time, therefore the parties need 
the identities of their counterparties to locate them later on. Thus parties that have financial 
claims against one another generally do not remain anonymous.100 By contrast, the sale and 
purchase of goods and services generally transpire in such a way that parties need not know the 
identities of their counterparties, or any case do not retain information about such identities. 
Transactions in goods and services require the keeping of identities only insofar as they create 
claims over time (e.g. warranty for defective products) or the relationship of agency. 
 
The distinctiveness of agency relationships and financial transactions in terms of the 
keeping of party identities has, to my knowledge, seldom been noted.101 It is, however, related to 
the claims that law and economics scholars have made about the contexts in which parties make 
enforceable contracts. Polinsky and Shavell, for example, suggest that contracts are first needed 
in “virtually any kind of financial arrangement.”102 For similar reasons, they suggest that parties 
make enforceable contracts to arrange “the supply of customized or specialized goods and 
services, which cannot be purchased on a spot market in a simultaneous exchange for money.”103  
 
 The presence of agency relationships or financial claims predicts the boundaries of 
information reporting remarkably well. In the U.S., most types of information reporting are done 
by parties in agency relationships or subject to financial claims. Reporting by employers and 
brokers are examples of the former; reporting by payors of interest, dividends, social security 
payments, and by partnerships and S-corporations are examples of the latter. Recently introduced 
reporting by payment settlement entities such as Visa and third party settlement entities such as 
eBay104 can be viewed as based on both agency and financial relationships. The major deviation 
from reporting by principals, agents, and parties subject to financial claims is reporting by 
businesses of payments to service providers of annual amounts in excess of $600 (i.e. the 
issuance of 1099-MISC forms). Even here, the limitation of information reporting to recipients 
of services (as opposed to goods) requires rationalization, which is easily suggested by the fact 
that most such services involve either an agency relationship or at least something very close.  
 
The connection between agency and financial transactions, on the one hand, and 
information reporting, on the other, is straightforward. In such transactions, market participants 
routinely record payments made to identified parties. All the government has to do in imposing 
reporting requirements is to harness such information. By contrast, in other transactions where 
parties do not normally keep track of mutual identities, obtaining information about such 
                                                 
100 Where they do, they are connected through a chain of non-anonymous agency relationships. 
101 I explore the implications of this phenomenon for the structure of international taxation in Wei Cui, Destination-
Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal, 67 U. TORONTO LAW J. 301 (2017), Part VI. 
102 Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (Lawrence Blume & Steven Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2005). This is presumably because such arrangements 
inherently require performance in the future. 
103 Id. Indeed, the relationship of contract itself perhaps always implies non-anonymity between the contracting 
parties. But non-anonymity may extend to agency relationships without contract. And while there may be many 
instances of non-agency, non-financial contracts, the absence of payment under such contracts (until the time of 
performance) may render them less relevant for income tax purposes.  Hence the claim here that information 
reporting always involves agency relationships and financial transactions can be seen as an adaptation of Polinsky 
and Shavell’s general claim to the tax context. 
104 See Part III.C infra. 
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identities and associating transactions with them introduce costs not originally present in market 
activities. It is this kind of cost that policymakers may not find justifiable to impose, especially 
when the information gathered would offer only an incomplete picture of the tax base.   
 
A good illustration of this point is an third-party reporting device that has received 
frequent favorable comments from academics in recent years, but which are perceived to deliver 
only very mixed results in the real world: inducing consumers to report on merchants through the 
use of lotteries.105 Generally, we do not expect merchants to keep information about consumers, 
for reasons just noted. Suppose, however, that a lottery is established, so that consumers who 
report enough of their receipts from purchases may win a prize. Such a system was implemented 
in Sao Paolo, Brazil.106 To facilitate the lottery, merchants collected social security numbers 
from consumers, and such information was later on used for processing lottery claims. It is clear 
here that it is the lottery—a type of financial transaction107—that created the need of collecting 
information of consumers by merchants. By contrast, if we ask the question: How often do 
merchants (i.e. sellers of ordinary goods and services) need social security numbers from the 
customers? The answer is: Almost never.108     
 
Within the income tax context, the logic of agency relationships and financial claims 
helps to explain the scope of information reporting in two ways. First, if income can be 
computed only after taking deductions into account, and if either income or deductions or both 
arise from activities involving multiple market transactions, information reporting by payors is 
likely to require identity-keeping by market participants who would otherwise not keep mutual 
identities. The additional social cost of gathering and transmitting transactional information 
would be hard to justify, especially if even the aggregate of the transactions may not correctly 
reflect income (given the difference between cash and accrual accounting, between ordinary and 
capital expenditures, and so on).  
 
Second, agency relationships and relationships of financial claims explain the imposition 
of information reporting requirements even where the transactional amounts do not closely track 
the tax base, i.e. despite the likely ineffectiveness of information reporting. U.S. broker 
information reporting of gross receipts from the disposition of securities before the recent 
introduction of basis reporting is an example of this. The filing of forms 1099-MISC and 1099-K 
is another. Here, the adoption of information reporting can be rationalized at least by its 
relatively low cost—the government is merely harnessing information that market participants 
already possess. 
                                                 
105 For favorable academic comments on consumer lotteries in information reporting, see, e.g., Bankman, supra note 
15, at 510-11; Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, at 1753; Slemrod, supra note 11; and Joana 
Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors (London School of Economics and Political Science Working Paper, 2016). 
For critical discussion of real-world experience, see, e.g., IMF, supra note 2, at 29-30; Jonas Fooken et al., 
Improving VAT Compliance—Random Rewards for Tax Compliance (European Commission Taxation Papers 
Working Paper No. 51-2014, 2014).  
106 Naritomi, supra note 105. 
107 Many consumer lotteries aimed at improving tax collection involve instantaneous lotteries, and thus simply give 
incentives to consumers to help create paper trails (e.g. sales receipts) as opposed to actually involving them in 
information reporting. See Fooken, supra note 105.   
108 Consumers may voluntarily keep information about merchants (for purposes of returns, warranties, etc), but 
requiring information reporting by consumers on merchants would be something different. It would also violate the 
conditions of centralization and book-keeping infrastructure that Lederman identified. 
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In summary, TPIR is likely to be adopted only where the incremental cost of gathering 
transaction information (including identities of transacting parties) is small relative to business 
practices in the absence of tax, and especially if the additional cost of transmitting such 
information is matched by a distinct benefit for the government in identifying the tax base. 
Modern economic conditions and income tax law have molded a large portion of the individual 
income tax base to fit these conditions, but much of the rest of the tax base of “modern taxes” 
has never come close to meeting these conditions. I believe this account constitutes a more 
parsimonious description of patterns in the actual use of information reporting than previous 
accounts. Identifying such a systematic pattern should make the effective scope of information 
reporting less of an article of faith. 
C. Recent evidence: Does credit card reporting increase compliance?  
 
The theory just advanced is consistent with the very mixed evidence for the effectiveness 
of TPIR when implemented beyond the realm of wage and financial income. A uniquely 
authoritative study on this topic was carried out recently by economists at the IRS and the 
University of Michigan.109 Slemrod et al. examine how self-employed individual taxpayers 
(Schedule C filers) in the U.S. responded to information reporting newly introduced in 2011. 
Under the new reporting regime, electronic payments received by businesses (e.g. credit card 
payments and payments by online commerce platforms like eBay) are reported by the firms 
processing these payments. This enabled the researchers to carry out a large-scale study: Slemrod 
et al. matched 2.5 million new information returns (1099-Ks) filed in 2012 to the tax returns of 
over a million Schedule C filers.110  
 
At first glance, IRS’ capacity to analyze such a large quantity of information may bolster 
one’s confidence that TPIR would help detect and deter non-compliance. However, Slemrod et 
al.’s study suggests three sobering conclusions. First, the new information reporting regime has 
not detectably increased taxpayer compliance. Second, the data that the IRS possesses about 
individuals’ business income even under the post-2011 regime is very incomplete and noisy. And 
third, although careful econometric analyses establish instances of taxpayers’ strategic behavior 
in response to information reporting, the nature of the strategic behaviors detected is difficult to 
interpret; the data analysis thus does not yield clear audit implications.  
1. 1099-K reporting: incompleteness and minimal deterrence effect 
 
Slemrod et al. first found that at least in the first two years (2011-2), the introduction of 
Form 1099-K had no impact on the aggregate net income reported by Schedule C filers.111 There 
was also no detectable additional deterrence effect relative to pre-existing information 
reporting.112 They conclude that “the overall initial deterrence effect of the new form of reporting 
                                                 
109 Slemrod et al., supra note 11,  
110 These information returns represented $160 billion (3%) of the total $5.3 trillion of receipts reported to the IRS 
on all 10.3 million 1099-Ks through the new information reporting program. Id., at 7. 
111 Id., at 11. 
112 The revenue growth for taxpayers who became subject to information reporting for the first time under 1099-K 
followed similar trends, on average, to other groups of taxpayers already subject to prior information reporting (e.g. 
23 
 
was minimal.”113 Rather, the main impact of the introduction of Form 1099-K discovered by 
their study is on a small group of taxpayers representing less than 10% of their sample: the 
characters and behavior detected of this group are further discussed below.114 But before turning 
to such specific findings, it is important to reflect on Slemrod et al.’s finding about the overall 
population—of minimal deterrence. This seems disappointing, especially to those who had 
advocated the adoption of the credit-card reporting. Whatever social costs have been incurred in 
the preparation and issuance of 1099-K forms, no new revenue, it appears, was raised.  
 
This result can be explained in a number of ways. For instance, the most common type of 
tax evasion is done through cash transactions anyway.115 But perhaps equally importantly, even 
if one disregards tax-motivated uses of cash, one might be concerned that the scope of credit-
card reporting is insufficiently broad. Slemrod et al’s data suggests that for those taxpayers 
subject to 1099-K reporting, more than 85% reported receipts that are significantly greater than 
the amounts shown on the 1099-Ks they receive—indeed, most taxpayers report far more—and 
only fewer than 5% reported significantly less.116 Under Slemrod et al’s theoretical assumptions, 
in the absence of information reporting, taxpayers who are predisposed to cheat will under-report 
business receipts. When there is information reporting, these taxpayers may believe that failing 
to declare at least the amounts of receipts reported on Form 1099-Ks substantially and 
discontinuously increases the risk of audit. Therefore, such taxpayers would report amounts on 
their Schedule Cs that are at least equal to amount reported on 1099-Ks. In other words, 
information reporting creating a floor for reported receipts. When this idea is applied to the real 
world, however, it appears that this floor was binding only for about 10% of the Schedule C filer 
population.  
 
This is consistent with the idea that for most businesses, a substantial gap may exist 
between the volume of all market transactions and the volume of transactions for which the 
parties maintain mutual identities. Indeed, this idea is the basis for the main analytical strategy of 
Slemrod et al’s study. They assume that amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks will accurately 
represent the total business receipts only for a very small segment of taxpayers, e.g. online sellers 
who derive most of their receipts from the likes of eBay, etc. Based on this assumption, they 
hypothesize that among those taxpayers whose reported receipts on Schedule C closely match 
amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks, a substantial portion will be taxpayers with “a high 
propensity to under-report receipts prior to the introduction of information reporting”.117 In other 
words, rather than seeing amounts reported on Form 1099-Ks as setting a relevant benchmark for 
truthful reporting, close matching between Schedule C and 1099-K receipts should be seen as a 
potential sign of cheating.    
 
                                                 
using1099-MISC). The trends are also similar for the group of taxpayers not subject to either type of reporting. Id., 
at 12. 
113 Id. 
114 See Part III.C.2 infra.  
115 Id., at 1. 
116 Id., at 35 (Figure 2); correspondence with Joel Slemrod and Daniel Reck. “Significantly” greater or less here 
means amounts either 5% greater or 5% less than the amounts reported on the relevant 1099-Ks.   
117 Id., at 1. 
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This methodology stands the traditional conception of the benefits of information 
reporting (e.g. in connection with wage and passive financial income) on its head. Under the 
traditional paradigm, third-party payors provide near-complete information about taxable income 
to the government, such that taxpayers are “unable to cheat” on such income.118 For credit-card 
reporting, however, third-party information may be so incomplete in respect of both taxable 
receipts and deductible expenses that two consequences inevitably follow. First, credit-card 
reporting may leave plenty of room for the under-statement of taxable receipts for taxpayers 
whose receipts far exceed the amounts subject to 1099-K reporting. Second, even if credit card 
reporting forces some taxpayers to report more taxable receipts than they would have reported 
otherwise, they are not thereby “disabled” from cheating, because they can still fudge numbers 
on the deductions side. This second consequence is illustrated by Slemrod et al’s finding of 
taxpayer strategic behavior.  
2. Strategic behavior in response to information reporting  
 
Slemrod et al postulate that credit card reporting would force some taxpayers to report 
more taxable receipts than they would otherwise. But two other types of related behavior are also 
likely. First, these taxpayers may report amounts on their Schedule Cs not much more than, and 
possibly exactly equal to, amount reported on 1099-Ks. Second, they may increase reported 
expenses to offset increased reported receipts, because it is more difficult to verify expenses than 
to verify receipts: when information reporting is incomplete, third-party-reported amounts may 
set a useful floor for reported receipts, but they do not provide a useful ceiling for reported 
expenses. Overall, then, Slemrod et al argue that if one observes taxpayers who (i) file tax 
returns only when subject to information reporting, (ii) whose self-declared receipts largely 
match third-party reported receipts, and/or (iii) whose expenses closely match receipts, such 
patterns are potentially indicative of a propensity towards tax evasion. 
 
Motivated by such reasoning, Slemrod et al. focused on the 9-10% of their taxpayer 
sample that reported gross receipts within 5% of the gross amount on the 1099-K’s issued to 
them. This is the group of taxpayers that “bunched” around the point where the ratio of (i) the 
receipts reported on 1099-K forms issued to the taxpayer (denoted “K’) to (ii) gross receipts 
reported on a taxpayer’s Schedule C (denoted “R’) is 1.119  Slemrod et al. observe that taxpayers 
with K/R close to 1 report unusually large increases in receipts from 2010 to 2011, which cannot 
be explained by the trend of growth of taxpayers that happen to have a high share of true receipts 
subject to information reporting. Instead, it is likely that many taxpayers with K/R close to 1 
reported more receipt after becoming subject to additional third-party reporting.   
 
  Slemrod et al. find several other types of evidence of taxpayer strategic behavior. First, 
taxpayers with K/R close to 1 in 2011 were substantially less likely to have filed a Schedule C in 
                                                 
118 Kleven et al, supra note 11. 
119 “Bunching” means an abnormal concentration of taxpayers at a point relative to the overall distribution of 
taxpayers along a given dimension. However, not all taxpayers that bunch around K/R=1 deserve suspicion. Some 
taxpayers may simply have a high share of true receipts subjected to information reporting. If they report truthfully, 
their reported receipts should largely match third-party reported receipts. Slemrod et al. confirm the presence of such 
taxpayers. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 15. 
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prior years.120 Second, taxpayers bunching around K/R=1 also reported large increases in 
expenses, which to a great extent offset the increases in reported receipts by this group, resulting 
in little change in net income reported. Third, taxpayers bunching at where K/R=1 and new 
Schedule C filers who also receive1099-Ks are disproportionately likely to also bunch around the 
point where the ratio of reported expense to receipt is 1. Fourth and finally, the authors examine 
the composition of expenses to see precisely where taxpayers increased expense reporting to 
offset increased receipts reporting, and find increases occurred primarily in the “Other Expenses” 
line item. In other words, the new reported expenses seem opaque in their nature. 
 
It seems likely, therefore, that some of the “bunching” taxpayers are cheating. The group 
of taxpayers showing the foregoing “suspect” patterns comes up to about 1% of the total 
population of taxpayers that the authors studied.121 This suggests a potential benefit of TPIR for 
improving the IRS’ audit strategies, despite the overall finding that U.S. credit card reporting has 
not yet improved taxpayer compliance. If one thinks of the IRS’s task of enforcing the law on 
schedule C filers as searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack, the new regime, it might 
be suggested, has the potential of both reducing the size of the haystack and also the size of the 
needle. It reduces the size of the haystack by getting the IRS to focus on the “bunchers”: 1099-K 
reporting gives the IRS a specific target group to direct its limited enforcement resources. It also 
enlarges the size of the needle by revealing taxpayers’ strategic behavior, such as new Schedule 
C filing, increased claims of expenses, and matching claims of increased expenses and receipts. 
Information reporting, in other words, may generate footprints for the IRS to follow.122 
 
 However, this optimistic view faces at least two objections. First, unlike taxpayers who 
under-declare wage income compared to amounts reported on their W-2s, many bunchers 
displaying “suspect” revenue and expense patterns may not be cheating. There are other, benign 
reasons why taxpayers may have increased receipt reporting (including by filing Schedule C for 
the first time) in response to information reporting, while simultaneously increasing reported 
expenses.123 Therefore audits of this taxpayer population will need to pick out the “needles” 
from the irrelevant, “needle-like” items.124 Second, Slemrod et al find that the “bunching” 
                                                 
120 This is the “extensive margin” response to 1099-K. The authors conservatively estimate that Form 1099-K 
caused more than 20% of taxpayers in this particular group to start filing Schedule C. 
121 Correspondence with Joel Slemrod and Daniel Reck.  
122 I am grateful to George Yin for discussions of this point. 
123 First, prior to information reporting, some taxpayers may have skipped reporting the portion of their total receipts 
that correspond to business expenses. The prior failure to report thus represents a form of what one might call “self-
help tax code simplification.” Second, many payments reported by credit card companies may not represent true 
business receipts, because of fees, taxes, and merchandise returns. Some taxpayers may have tried to reconcile such 
discrepancies between amounts on information returns and true receipts by reporting fees, taxes, and merchandise 
returns as “other expenses”.  Third, the tax law may impose limitations on business deductions so as to “quarantine” 
them to particular types of income. Greater income earned in such quarantined activities would automatically (and 
legitimately) increase deductible expenses. Slemrod et al. offers persuasive evidence that this third reason does not 
explain the increase in expense reporting by the “bunching” taxpayers they study. Slemrod et al., supra note 11, at 
footnote 32. However, the extent to which the two explanations given in the text underlie the increased expense 
reporting that they identify is unknown. Because Slemrod et al.’s formal model does not predict the complete offset 
of increased reported receipts by expenses even for strategic taxpayers, these explanations remain relevant. 
124 Moreover, if the IRS is determined to search in this corner of the haystack, then tax cheats may avoid coming 
into it: the only taxpayers remaining would be the ones who are innocent. This means that the IRS may not be able 
to commit to auditing this portion of the taxpayer population.  
26 
 
taxpayers tend to be significantly smaller than the typical 1099-K recipients.125 The revenue 
potential for devoting audit resources to this group is thus limited, and may compare unfavorably 
with the option of auditing larger taxpayers.  In other words, focusing on “bunchers” does not so 
much reduce the size of the haystack as to direct the IRS to an arbitrarily-determined corner of it. 
Therefore, it is not clear that credit-card information reporting will lead to superior audit 
strategies. Its potential at generating deterrence is similarly unclear.  
 
The foregoing critique is not meant to imply that the adoption of 1099-K reporting in the 
U.S. cannot have beneficial effects for U.S. tax administration. But it does suggest a general 
conclusion about the limitations of the TPIR’s utility, given its limited implementability. This 
limitation has two aspects. Suppose that, for the reasons given in Part III.B, TPIR requirements 
may be implementable only for a fraction of market transactions. Suppose that this fraction is β. 
Then, first, if for many taxpayers, the proportion of transactions they are disposed to report (α) 
without TPIR is a higher proportion (i.e. α >  β), then TPIR will have no effect on the 
compliance behavior of these taxpayers.126 This is so, even if α may be significantly less than 1. 
Second, when the coverage of TPIR is incrementally raised, some taxpayers may be forced to 
increase reporting their taxable receipts, while engaging in related strategic behavior. It is not 
clear, however, that the IRS should audit such taxpayers, because audit selection may be based 
not on how low α is, but on how likely it is that an audit will result in significant adjustments—
which depends not only on α but also the size of the taxpayer.127 
IV. Firms as “Fiscal Intermediaries”: An Inadequate Conception 
 
Previous scholars postulate that third-party reporting is an essential tax collection device 
that explains modern tax compliance and the capacity of developed countries to raise high levels 
of revenue.128 By contrast, I have portrayed third-party reporting as a derivative institution, 
incapable of explaining tax compliance by business firms and frequently substituted by other 
administrative devices in the history of modern taxation. Similarly, whereas many scholars view 
the scope of TPIR as affording indefinite expansion in the future,129 I argue that TPIR is 
characterized by definite limits. Nonetheless, I believe one fact that previous scholars have 
identified may still hold the key to understanding modern tax collection: namely, the centrality of 
business firms to the administration of modern taxes, be it the withholding of individual income 
and payroll, or retail sales taxes or the payment of the corporate income tax, the VAT, and other 
business taxes.130 The main question, I would argue, is how to conceptualize the causal 
connection between firms and tax compliance.  
                                                 
125 Id., at 14.  
126 Thus 1099-K reporting may have no effect on the 85% of Schedule C filers for whom the K/R ratio is much 
smaller than 1. See text accompanying notes 116 and 119 supra. For another example, sole proprietors in the U.S. on 
average may report only 50% of their business income. See IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 
2008–2010, supra note 83. But the coverage of TPIR (β) may well be below this percentage for many taxpayers. 
127 Suppose that taxpayers have total receipts of Ri but only report a portion αi. Tax agencies may be mainly 
interested in those with the largest Ri * (1-αi), not the ones with the largest (1-αi).  
128 E.g., KKS, supra note 3; Pomeranz , supra note 9; Kleven, supra note 8. 
129 Alm & Soled, supra note 21; Carrillo et al, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
130 See Part I supra.  
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The prevailing view of the role of firms in tax compliance is that they act as “fiscal 
intermediaries”: they collect and remit taxes, as well as provide information about other 
taxpayers, to the government.131 Firms generate tax-related information to the government in two 
ways. First, by providing information directly to the government about the taxable income and 
taxable transactions of employers, investors, and customers, they preclude the possibility of not 
reporting such income or transactions by the latter taxpayers. Second, firms maintain accounting 
and transaction records, which represent information that is not automatically transmitted to the 
government but which the government may use in conducting audits.132 Through both 
mechanisms, firms act as depositories of accurate taxpayer information which the government 
can access. This substantially increases the probability of detection of non-compliant behavior, 
sometimes to close to 100%. It therefore dramatically improves the deterrence effect of penalties 
on non-compliance.  
 
This conception of firms as passive depositories as well as mechanical intermediaries of 
transactional information is, to my knowledge, unusual in legal and social scientific scholarship 
outside the study of taxation. It is often explicitly tied to the classic deterrence theory of tax 
compliance, pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo.133 Under the Allingham and Sandmo model, 
a taxpayer decides whether to engage in tax evasion by weighing the expected benefits of 
evasion against expect costs from being caught and penalized. Taxpayers comply when the 
expected disutility of evasion, which depends on the probability of detection and the magnitude 
of penalties, outweighs its expected utility. It has been widely observed that by itself, this simple 
model of the choice about whether to evade taxes seems unable to explain the high level of tax 
compliance observed at least in developed countries: the actual levels of penalties, audits, and 
evasion detected during audits in real life are all far too low to lead a rational individual 
considering only these factors to decide against tax evasion.134 Nonetheless, scholars have 
suggested that the Allingham and Sandmo model can be salvaged if one “puts firms into [the 
theory]”.135 When firms both automatically provide information to the government and maintain 
information relevant to audits, then the probability of detection of tax evasion (conditional upon 
an audit being carried out) is increased. Moreover, when there are fewer firms than individual 
taxpayers, the audit rate for firms is higher than for individuals, which also increases the 
probability of detection.  
 
                                                 
131 See, e.g., KKS, supra note 3; Richard Bird, Why Tax Corporations? (Department of Finance Canada, Technical 
Committee on Business Taxation Working Papers No. 1996-02, 1996), 
https://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/~sgor/cit/bird_FinanceCanadaWP_1996/whytaxcorps.pdf  ("The key to effective taxation 
is information, and the key to information in the modem economy is the corporation”); Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra 
note 34, at 130.  
132 See, e.g., Gordon & Li, supra note 40; Pomeranz, supra note 9; KKS, supra note 3, at 2.   
133 Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUBLIC ECON. 323 
(1972); 
134 See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818 (1998); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax 
Avoidance, Evasion and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423 (A.J. Auerbach & M. 
Feldstein eds., 2002). Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 
OHIO STATE L.J. 1453, 1465 (2003). For information on actual rates of audit, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
DATA BOOK 2015 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf.  
135 Kopczuk & Slemrod, supra note 34. 
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Yet as our earlier discussion anticipated,136 this effort to reconcile the Allingham and 
Sandmo model with the observed high levels of tax compliance in the real world merely begs a 
further question: why do decision-makers in firms—owners, managers, and employers— choose 
not to evade tax? Why do they provide accurate information about other taxpayers to the 
government? In most countries, the population of firms is still large relative to the number of tax 
auditors, which means that the general probability of detection of tax evasion by firms would still 
be very low. Is there any device that renders firms intent on evasion “unable to cheat”? If not, 
then the Allingham and Sandmo model still cannot be reconciled with the levels of (firm) tax 
compliance observed in the world. Something else must explain observed firm compliance.   
 
One of the latest attempts to solve this puzzle is found in the KKS study mentioned in 
Part I.137 KKS analyze a firm’s “decision” not to evade tax as the feasibility for employers and 
employees to maintain an equilibrium of collusion: if everyone in the firm can agree to and 
honor a bargain to cheat on the taxes that the firm is required to remit, and to divide up the firms’ 
consequent cash savings, then the firm will evade taxes. They argue that such equilibrium would 
be difficult to maintain under two types of circumstances. First, individual disgruntled (or 
morally conscientious) employees create a small probability that the collusion would be reported 
and detected, and such probabilities would become sufficiently large when the firm is 
sufficiently large.138 Second, the government can offer monetary awards for whistleblowing to 
employees who otherwise would have been willing to collude in the firm’s tax evasion. KKS in 
effect offer an analog of the Allingham and Sandmo model for firms: the probability of detection 
of evasion behavior crucially depends, not on audits conducted by the government, but on 
disgruntled employees or whistleblowers.      
 
Unfortunately, this account of firms’ tax compliance decisions is just as problematic as 
the traditional account of individual tax compliance decisions. To begin, although whistleblower 
programs operated by tax and other regulatory agencies have attracted attention in recent years, 
their role in the history of tax and other areas of regulatory enforcement has been minimal.139 
Even today, whistleblower programs are viewed as complements to regulatory agencies’ audit 
operations, allowing the government to discover violations that would otherwise be difficult to 
                                                 
136 See Part II.A supra.  
137 KKS, supra note 3. Another strand of the recent literature claims that firms do not cheat because they are subject 
to information reporting by other firms, for example through mechanisms under the VAT. See Pomeranz, supra note 
9, at 2541; Carrillo et al, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 14. I have argued elsewhere that this strand 
of analysis involves mischaracterizations of and implausible claims about the VAT. 
138 KKS does not provide any simulation to specify how many employees a firm needs to have for evasion to be 
infeasible. 
139 See, e.g., Laura Saunders, How to Turn In Your Neighbor to the IRS, Wall ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2011),  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903352704576540840395329676 (quoting tax historian Joseph 
Thorndike as reporting that payments to whistleblowers in the history of U.S. taxation “tended to be small and rare 
because IRS officials were uncomfortable with ‘bounty hunting’”); Peter J. Henning, Whistle-Blowing Insiders: 
‘Game Changer’ for the S.E.C., N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/dealbook/whistle-blowing-insiders-game-changer-for-the-sec.html (a 
whistleblower program was only recently adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); Jordan A. 
Thomas, Policing the Banks Is an Inside Job, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/opinion/policing-the-banks-is-an-inside-job.html (advocating the adoption of 
a whistleblower program by banking regulators). 
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uncover,140 rather than as a mechanism imposing more systematic constraints on taxpayers and 
other regulated subjects than audits themselves. It is simply implausible to claim that 
whistleblower programs undergird the transformation of public finance in the 20th century 
witnessed in most advanced economies.141 Moreover, while it is commonly observed that larger 
firms tend to be more compliant with tax law and other legal requirements, firm size in itself 
does not preclude fraudulent activity: recent reports of large-scale frauds at Volkswagen and 
Wells Fargo offer vivid reminders of this fact.142 
 
In the (vast) legal and social scientific literature on tax compliance,143 the inadequacy of 
the Allingham and Sandmo model has led to a variety of theories about why individuals may be 
motivated to follow the tax law.144 It is not the intention of this Article to review or even 
summarize this variety of theories.145 I will instead note two features of the literature. First, 
theories that are presented as major alternatives to the Allingham and Sandmo model tend to 
postulate psychological features of individuals that are not captured by that model.146 However, 
to my knowledge, none has attempted to “put firms into [the theory]” in the way that scholars 
(such as KKS) aiming to salvage/expand the Allingham and Sandmo model have done. In other 
words, only scholars interested in reformulating the Allingham and Sandmo model have given 
significance to the regular empirical association between the presence of business firms and 
higher levels of tax compliance. Yet at Part I discussed, such empirical regularity seems 
unmistakable and forms part of the conventional wisdom of what makes tax administration 
effective. Of course, conventional wisdoms may be mistaken (as I have argued is the case for the 
belief about the importance of TPIR), but they may also be robust and offer important theoretical 
insights.   
 
                                                 
140 See Henning, supra note 139 (for example, rewards for whistleblowers are increased in areas of agency priority).  
141 See Figure 2 in Part I supra.  
142 Russell Hotten , Volkswagen: The scandal explained , BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772; Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, THE 
NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fine-against-wells-fargo-
points-to-the-failure-of-regulation. 
143 See Slemrod, supra note 11 for a review of recent scholarship; for earlier reviews, see Andreoni et al., supra note 
134; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 134;  Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a 
Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 102 (2007) 
144 The inadequacy of the deterrence theory of compliance in other areas of publicly-enforced law has led to similar 
explorations in alternative theories. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of 
Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003).  
145 A relatively recent summary and set of references can be found in Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using 
Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 696-701 (2009). Another recent literature 
review can be found in Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 149 (2014).  
146See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: 
Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837 (1990) (showing that the effect of the feeling of guilt 
or shame on tax cheating deterrence is greater than the effect of legal sanctions); Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. 
Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 213 (1982) (showing that feelings of guilt have a greater effect on tax evasion deterrence than the threat 
of legal sanctions); FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 102–03 (1990) 
(Finding that taxpayers’ perceptions of other taxpayers in the same social grouping affect taxpaying attitudes and 
behaviors). 
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Second, many scholars have formulated theories and empirically tested hypotheses about 
tax compliance as though tax compliance is a self-contained social problem.147 Although some 
legal scholars have argued that people comply with the tax law simply because there is a social 
norm of complying with the law,148 this is not an approach generally followed. Instead, scholars 
tend to study individual preferences and attitudes specifically towards tax compliance, as if 
paying tax has become a deep-rooted part of our psyche.149 Yet modern taxation directly 
affecting the obligations of mass populations of individuals has been practiced in most countries 
for barely a century.  
 
These features of the existing literature imply that existing theories of tax compliance  
may have neglected two institutional foundations of modern tax collection. The first is the 
business firm, which performs most of the compliance obligations under all modern taxes.150 
Ironically, those scholars who have stressed the business firm’s significance in tax compliance 
have at the same time conceived of it in such as a way (i.e. as a mechanical information 
depository and transmission device) as to give it very limited explanatory power. The second is 
the modern legal system, as embodied by institutions that play legislative, regulatory, 
enforcement, and adjudicatory functions, and as animated by the social norm of compliance with 
the law. The key to understanding tax compliance may precisely lie in understanding how 
individual behavior is mediated by these two types of institutions. I now describe how such an 
explanation would work.  
V.  Firms as Sites of Social Cooperation Ordered by Law 
 
Consider the postulate that in modern (i.e. industrial and post-industrial) economies, most 
business firms operate, for the most part, in compliance with the law. If this is true, then an 
important social scientific question will be why it is true—what has brought about the state of 
affairs it describes. But let me clarify first what the postulate means and what follows from it, if 
it is true. 
 
The claim that most modern business firms mostly comply with the law is meant to 
convey the following two ideas. First, most firms operate in ways that are constrained by a wide 
range of legal rules and norms. That is, a firm makes its decisions while heeding most of the 
requirements of contract law, tort law, property (including intellectual property) law, and other 
relevant bodies of private law. It also attends to the relevant requirements of various bodies of 
regulatory law, such as those regarding public and workplace safety, labor and employment, 
                                                 
147 Erich Kirchler, The art of dodging, FINANCIAL WORLD (Jun.-Jul. 2015), at p.43; Erik Hoelzl et al., Enforced 
versus voluntary tax compliance: The ‘‘slippery slope’’ framework, 29 J. ECON. PSYCH. 210 (2008); ERICH 
KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR (2007).  
148 See Eric Posner, Law and social norms: The case of tax compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000). 
149 See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 134; Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 146; Grasmick & Scott, supra note 
146; James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the 
United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224 (2006); Michael R. Welch et al., “But Everybody Does 
It . . .”: The Effects of Perceptions, Moral Pressures, and Informal Sanctions on Tax Cheating, 25 SOC. SPECTRUM 
21 (2005). 
150 Parts I-II supra. 
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environmental protection, financial prudence and disclosure, and so on. This does not mean that 
the firm is necessarily perfectly compliant with the law. Far from it. Volkswagen may 
systematically install illegal "defeat devices" in its diesel engines to dodge the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s emission tests.151 But this could happen while the company at the same time 
conscientiously follows all kinds of other legal requirements imposed by Germany and the 
United States. Wells Fargo may put intense pressure on retail branch employees to meet sales 
targets, knowing that this had led to and would continue to lead to the creation of fake customer 
accounts, but the bank meanwhile could very well be highly compliant in its tax and securities 
filings.152 In other words, for many firms that purposely engage in one type of illegal behavior or 
another, they nonetheless are acting in compliance with a wide range of other applicable laws. 
They do not cheat “wherever they can”, in the sense of exploiting every opportunity of earning 
an expected profit by violating the law.  
 
Second, while some business firms may be better behaved than Volkswagen and Wells 
Fargo, others are of course more ill-behaved. Some firms act in dodgy ways in respect of many 
legal requirements. But it may be plausible to classify these firms into several categories. To 
begin, there are the very small firms—indeed in economists’ use of the term, a “firm” could be a 
sole business proprietor. A small firm’s behavior would not be distinguishable from the behavior 
of its few individual owners or employees, and there is little intra-firm organization or 
coordination. Alternatively, a frequently law-dodging firm could be large, but we expect to be 
one that is otherwise uncompetitive in the market it operates: it needs to cheat wherever possible 
just to survive.153 Finally, there are of course firms that are formed deliberately to commit fraud 
or other crimes. However, putting this last type of firms aside, and even considering small firms 
and firms under intense competitive pressure and the fact that these firms are more likely to act 
in disregard of the law than others, the following seems to be true: few firms are organized with 
the expectation that it would deliberately profit from the violation of all laws that are profitable 
to violate, and few firms grow and remain competitive by profiting from illegal activities. This is 
what I mean by the claim that most modern business firms mostly comply with the law, 
 
Having explained the meaning of the claim, I now explain one crucial consequence of it. 
The claim implies that most modern business firms would not make decisions about tax 
compliance in the way that KKS’ model suggests: they do not decide to comply with the tax law 
only when an internal collusive bargain about how to divide the spoils of tax evasion cannot be 
sustained. Instead, complying with the tax law, likely complying with other bodies of laws, is the 
default option. If a firm is generally compliant with the law, then compliance with the tax law 
should simply be expected. Specific firms may be engaged in non-compliance with the tax law at 
specific times, but such behavior is to be explained in the same way as one would want to 
explain why Volkswagen decided to install its “defeat devices”, and why Wells Fargo pushed its 
employees towards fraudulent practices. In other words, when the baseline expectation is 
compliance, specific instances of non-compliance are what require explanation, not the multitude 
of instances of compliance. 
                                                 
151 Hotten, supra note 142. 
152 Davidson, supra note 142. 
153 See Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial 
Firms, 119 ECON. J. (LONDON) 764 (2009); Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior? 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 414 (2004). 
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Here, it should be noted that KKS’ model has a common structure with the Allingham 
and Sandmo model of individual tax compliance: the taxpayer, whether a firm or an individual, 
always confronts a meaningful choice between complying and not complying with tax law, and it 
would choose to comply only when the expected penalty for non-compliance is large enough. 
Moreover, this choice is conceived in a way that could characterize choices about whether to 
comply with any other body of law: as long as the expected rewards of non-compliance outweigh 
the expected punishment of non-compliance, non-compliance should be observed. The empirical 
postulate above about modern business firms’ general tendency towards law compliance 
precisely contradicts the premise of these theoretical models.154 It claims instead that modern 
business firms are generally law-abiding, or at least enough of them are for tax and other 
regulatory systems generally to function. 
 
But making this postulate is not the end, but only the beginning, of social scientific 
inquiries. The important social scientific question is not why, given the default choice of 
cheating, most (large) firms don’t cheat on their taxes. It is rather why these firms may not even 
consider cheating on their taxes—why cheating is not their default choice. A number of 
theoretical and historical considerations suggest that there may be genuine answers to this 
question, and that it does not just offer a rhetorical reformulation of the seemingly intractable 
controversy about what produces compliance on the part of individual taxpayers.     
 
The first, theoretical consideration is that firms generally form in order to earn some 
economic rent.155 If there is no economic rent to be made, one can simply purchase and sell in 
                                                 
154 There is an obvious analogue of this objection to the KKS model for the Allingham and Sandmo model. The 
latter model is famously inspired by Gary Becker’s economic model of crime: when Allingham and Sandmo 
conceptualize an individual taxpayer’s compliance decision, they portray the person in a way similar to a criminal 
weighing the costs and benefits of a crime. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POLIT. ECON. 169 (1968).  However, Becker did not set out to explain why ordinary people do not commit crime by 
his economic model: his economic theory of deterrence is intended only to apply to criminals. Allingham and 
Sandmo, on the other hand, conflate the ordinary taxpayer deciding what to enter on his tax return and a criminally-
minded person ready to cheat on his taxes where possible. That is to say, they elide the distinction between the 
ordinary person and the criminal in depicting the rational choice about tax compliance. Whether this is a plausible 
depiction of the average taxpayer’s psychology is controversial. Those who favor the Allingham and Sandmo model 
presumably find the characterization more (or at least no less) plausible than representations of the average taxpayer 
as pro-social, conscientiously law-abiding, and simply oblivious to the potential rewards of cheating. The argument I 
make in this Part does not require one to take a position directly on this controversy. 
155 See generally G.C. Archibald, Theory of the firm, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
(Lawrence Blume & Steven Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2005) (reviewing theories of the firm and the role of quasi-rent in 
such theories);  OLIVER. E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996) (firms are distinguished by 
firm-specific assets that generate quasi-rent); Oliver E. Williamson, Examining economic organization through the 
lens of contract, 12 IND. CORP. CHANGE 917 (2003); Joseph T. Mahoney & Lihong Qian, Market Frictions as 
Building Blocks of An Organizational Economics Approach to Strategic Management, 34 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1019 
(2013) (using a theory of rent-generating market frictions to explain the existence of the firm); D. Bruce Johnsen, 
The Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L. J. 1277 (1995); 
Benjamin Klein et al, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW 
ECON. 297 (1978); Oliver D. Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 
(1989); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988). 
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the market and there is no need to form a firm.156 However, if firms are generally formed with 
the purpose of earning rent given market prices, then there is no need for firms already formed to 
further exploit profits from violations of the law. It is true that some illegal activities can be 
conducted only through firms (e.g. certain Ponzi schemes, VAT carousal fraud, etc.).157 But it is 
also the case that most illegal activities can be pursued without forming firms. Therefore, if a 
firm is formed not in order to profit from illegal activities, but with the purpose of earning rents 
from other identified opportunities, then it would not be surprising if the firm does not 
maximally exploit opportunities arising from illegal behavior—that is simply not its purpose. 
 
 A second consideration, which is both theoretical and historical in nature, is that much of 
the modern legal system is concerned with how to divide up the rent earned by firms among the 
contributors to the firm—employees, lenders, equity investors, suppliers and customers.158 This 
is what corporate and other organizational law is about.159 It also forms an important part of the 
substance of employment, labor and securities law. That is to say, social cooperation that is 
centered on a firm inherently presupposes ways of dividing up the surplus from cooperation, and 
the legal system appears to have been deeply involved in facilitating this division and thus 
enabling firm-centered cooperation. Therefore, firm-centered social cooperation is a 
paradigmatic form of “legal order”—social cooperation mediated by legal norms.160   
 
A recent study by Suresh Naidu and Noam Yuchtman of labor market institutions in 19th-
century United States vividly illustrates this consideration.161  Naidu and Yuchtman examine a 
part of U.S. history (1850 until the early 1920s) when labor markets were still largely 
unregulated.162 They first show that firm-specific rents were frequently observed in urban 
American labor markets: when firms experienced positive output price shocks, their employees 
earned wage premia, relative to other employees with very similar skills in the same urban labor 
market. They then argue that the existence of rents in the labor contract created space for 
bargaining and conflict between employees and employers: strikes became sharply more 
frequent in the late 19th century and early 20th century, often involved physical coercion against 
replacement workers, and were correlated with higher workers' wages. On their side, employers 
occasionally called in the police and military to break strikes, but more frequently and equally 
effectively sought judicial injunctions to end strikes. In other words, even before the advent of 
                                                 
156 Ronald H. Coase, The nature of the firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (firms form to reduce transaction cost and 
earn profit that could not be earned through market transactions). 
157 See, e.g., Vimal Kumar & Stergios Skaperdas, On the Economics of Organized Crime (University of California-
Irvine, Department of Economics, Working Papers No. 70815, 2008), 
http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2007-08/skaperdas-15.pdf; GIANLUCA FIORENTINI & SAM 
PELTZMAN (EDS.), THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME (1995).  
158 See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984) (modelling how managers 
facilitate cooperation game among capitalists and workers to achieve institutional rent). 
159 Nicolai J. Foss et al, The Theory of The Firm, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE REGULATION 
OF CONTRACTS 631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds. 1999). 
160 For the concept of a legal order as opposed to social cooperation governed by other types of social norms, see 
Gillian Hadfield & Barry Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rules of Law, 17 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 21 (2014). 
161 Suresh Naidu & Noam Yuchtman, Labor Market Institutions in the Gilded Age (NBER Working Paper No. 
22117, 2016).  
162 Some European countries had already adopted labor regulations at the time. Naidu & Yuchtman, Id., among 
others, William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America: A Study of the 
Constitutive Power of Law, 16 LAW SOC. INQ  1 (1991). 
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labor and employment regulations, both the coercive apparatus of the state and judicial 
institutions were called upon to resolve intra-firm conflicts. Subsequent labor and wage 
regulations that began to be adopted at the state level in the early 20th century and at the federal 
level as a result of the New Deal are clearly more permanent legal institutions that allowed firm-
centered social cooperation to continue. 
 
 In other words, reliance on the legal system—and in particular on the regulatory 
apparatus of the state—may be essential to the growth of the modern business firm as we know 
it. Compliance with legal rules and norms, and monitoring the compliance of other parties, are 
intrinsic aspects of the modern business firm as an institution. From this perspective, the basic 
reason that large firms are more likely to be compliant is not that the probability of motivated 
whistleblowers is higher in them (or that they have greater external visibility). The potentially 
more important reason is that the firms grew larger because they were profitable, and the 
participants in them are more interested in the orderly division of profits than the disorder 
implied by cheating (on taxes and other regulatory matters). While the keeping of business 
records and proper accounting practices form a part of this cooperative process, their main 
benefit for tax compliance may arise not from facilitating effective audits by the government, but 
from the fact that they allow participants in a firm to monitor one another in assessing whether 
the expectation of fair divisions of profits is fulfilled. 
 
 This conjecture seems consistent with history of modern taxation in different industrial 
economies. In the United States, for example, the adoption of the “mass income tax” began in 
1939 and the withholding of income tax on wage payments—the administrative institution that 
scholars previously focused on—began in 1943.163 Both were pre-dated by the adoption of 
withholding of social security taxes in 1935. To track the roots of income tax compliance in the 
United States, therefore, one needs to explain why business firms complied with the social 
security excise on employers and with the even earlier legal requirements (enacted in 1909) to 
pay corporate income taxes. Previous tax legal scholarship has suggested that the corporate 
income tax was conceived from the beginning as at least in part a device for regulating large U.S. 
corporations, and this regulatory impulse was also manifest in corporate and anti-trust law 
developments at the same time.164 But just as relevantly, corporations and employers in general 
had already been subject to other forms of regulation, to facilitate the formation of American 
financial and labor markets. By the time the corporate income tax was put in place, whether or 
not to comply with the law was presumably neither a new question nor one that businesses can 
easily give a negative answer to, if they were to continue to operate at all.  
 
 In summary, it seems that as a matter of actual history, two interrelated institutions might 
have represented the central components of the foundation of modern tax collection. The first is 
the business firm. The second is the set of legal rules and norms that developed from the 18th to 
the 20th century that accompanied the growth of the corporate form: organizational law, anti-trust 
and securities regulation, and labor and employment law, in addition to the ever-present bodies 
                                                 
163 Notably, the previous version of wage withholding, introduced in 1860, involved the withholding only by the 
federal government as employer, not business firms.  
164 See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1193;  Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 447, 
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of contract, property, tort and other private law. Because the operation of most business firms 
was inseparable from the implementation and following of legal orders, the decision to comply 
with the tax law was a natural one for firms to make. Upon these foundations, both business 
taxes and taxes imposed on individuals but remitted by businesses evolved, with withholding, 
third-party reporting, other administrative devices, and legal doctrines that guide the use of such 
devices all emerging simultaneously. Self-reporting, audits and other methods of enforcing the 
tax law were always important to tax collection, just they were important to securing compliance 
with other types of law applicable to firms. But most firms in most circumstances may also have 
displayed a substantial degree of voluntary compliance, insofar as the laws they followed 
enabled social cooperation in the context of the firm in the first place.     
 
 Three features distinguish the foregoing account of modern tax compliance from previous 
accounts. First, the explanation is institutional: it makes reference to specific institutions, social 
practices, and legal norms. By contrast, much of the social scientific literature on tax compliance, 
like the Allingham and Sandmo model, is psychological and predicts social behavior from 
assumptions about individual psychology (the only institutions assumed are tax return filing, 
auditing and the imposition of penalties). The benefit of the institutional approach is that it 
allows us to focus on explaining why rational, self-interested individuals may engage in 
cooperation in specific contexts, instead of explaining why they are generally willing to 
cooperate.  
 
Second, while other scholars have also emphasized the importance of the firm as a crucial 
institutional component of modern tax compliance, under the account given here, there is much 
more going on in firms than the keeping of business records and accounting books potentially of 
interest to tax auditors. Instead, firms are places where members of society actively cooperate 
under regimes of law. Instead of gaming the system where they can, individuals pursued profit 
and bargained for rent within the confines of law. This approach has strong support from 
economic theories of the firm,165 and allows the psychological theories of compliance to be 
enriched by the rich theoretic and empirical literature in organizational economics.  
 
Third, the account captures the intuition of many that there is nothing special about tax 
compliance per se, vis-à-vis compliance with other aspects of the law: they should be explainable 
by the same motivations. However, instead of postulating general pro-social, norms-respecting 
motivations for individual taxpayers, the account suggests that they will be motivated to act this 
way, in respect to many types of law, in the context of the firm. It is worth noting here that using 
TPIR to explain modern tax compliance would provide one with no purchase in explaining most 
others types of compliance with the law. As suggested above, the conception of business firms as 
passive and mechanical depositories and transmission devices for taxpayer information has no 
analogue in other literature.166 Seeing business firms as institutions within which individuals can 
cooperate in an indefinite range of ways while being regulated by an indefinite range of legal 
norms, by contrast, not only constitutes a generalizable theory of tax compliance but also gives 
such theory greater plausibility.  
                                                 
165 See sources cited in notes 155-159 supra.  
166 See, e.g. Vandenbergh, supra note 144, which makes a strong effort to draw analogies between tax compliance 
and compliance with environmental regulations, but in which third party information reporting plays no role.   
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VI. Policy Implications 
 
 Understanding the institutional foundations of modern taxation has deep policy 
implications both for developing countries aiming to enhance their state capacity167 and for 
developed countries like the United States aiming to improve tax compliance.168 This Part offers 
a preliminary discussion of how the perspective developed in the preceding Parts suggests policy 
directions different from what scholarship focused on TPIR would recommend. 
A. Implications for Developing Countries  
 
There is no doubt that in any country, when the level of tax compliance is low, tax 
collectors thirst for taxpayer information. It is thus hard to overstate the appeal to developing 
countries of the notion that high-tax, advanced economies have designed institutions for 
transmitting and making use of massive amounts of taxpayer information. If such information 
gathering devices can be adopted, they would be effective substitutes for voluntary compliance. 
Taxpayers would have no choice but to obey the law.169 A technological approach to tax 
administration would then help many poor countries overcome the weaknesses of their 
institutions.       
 
As much as recent scholarship on TPIR has encouraged this notion,170 this Article has 
argued that it is fundamentally untenable. Promoting the forms of TPIR that are commonly 
adopted in developed economies is unlikely to dramatically enhance tax administration capacity 
in developing countries, for the following reasons. First, the standard forms of TPIR adopted by 
developed countries apply to the collection of the personal income tax on wage and passive 
financial income. But all available evidence suggests that developing countries already deploy 
similar administrative devices—especially withholding—for such tax base. For example, Leslie 
Robinson and Joel Slemrod examined whether developing countries use information reporting 
and/or withholding less than developed countries, by systematically coding comparative 
information about tax administration published by the OECD.171 They analyzed, for each of 47 
countries, (1) the total number of income categories for which tax is withheld and remitted by the 
payer; (2) the total number of categories of income that are subject to information reporting; and 
(3) the extent to which taxpayer identification numbers (TINs) are used as measured by the total 
number of payment types that use TINs. It turns out that all of these variables are negatively 
correlated with a country’s GDP per capita: the poorer countries use withholding, information 
reporting, and identity-matching more.172 They thus observe: “In higher-income countries, the 
                                                 
167 See notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text. 
168 See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text.  
169 Kleven et al, supra note 12.  
170 See text accompanying notes 9-14, 34-41 supra.  
171 Leslie Robinson & Joel Slemrod, Understanding Multidimensional Tax Systems, 19 INT. TAX PUBLIC FINAN. 237 
(2012). The information covers 30 OECD and 17 non-OECD countries for the year 2005. The 17 non-OECD 
countries include, among others, Brazil, India, China, Malaysia, Russia, and South Africa. 
172 Robinson and Slemrod, Id., also use factor analysis to construct a single variable that summarizes tax 
administration features of a country, which they label “Dispersed Responsibility”, and which they view as capturing 
“the extent to which the tax collection system disperses responsibility and the direct compliance burden away from 
the tax authority to the taxpayer and third parties such as employer withholders.” The same negative correlation with 
GDP per capita obtains for this variable. 
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revenue body uses withholding and reporting on fewer types of income.”173 Similar studies done 
by the IMF also suggest that many developing countries heavily rely on withholding.174  
 
 It is thus very unlikely that developing countries are not attuned to the wide use of 
withholding and TPIR for the personal income tax in developed countries. Instead, the problem 
is much more likely that they have far smaller tax bases comprising wage and passive financial 
income: their formal employment sectors and financial institutions are more under-developed.175 
The important question is then whether TPIR has proven to be useful, in the experience of 
developed countries, outside the context of these particular components of the personal income 
tax. As Parts I-III have shown, the answer is no. TPIR has had only limited application in the 
individual business income context,176 and its utility for increasing compliance in such a context 
is still open to debate.177 Moreover, such limitation may have universal explanations (e.g. in 
terms of when market participants keep mutual identities) invariant to developmental contexts.178 
In addition, developed countries rarely use TPIR in connection with other important modern 
taxes. It would clearly be a mistake to infer from the fact that wage and personal financial 
income constitute larger tax bases in developed countries to the conclusion that developed 
countries use TPIR in a wider variety of ways than (or in substantively different ways from) 
developing countries.179    
 
 As argued earlier, developed countries to a very large extent rely on businesses to 
withhold, remit, and pay most taxes.180 Voluntary business compliance lies at the foundation of 
TPIR, not the other way around.181 When businesses comply with the tax law, the government 
can afford to be somewhat indifferent about whether information on individual taxpayers is 
collected or analyzed. Tax administrators from developing countries are in fact likely to be quite 
familiar with this logic. Developing countries generally rely far less on the personal income tax 
and social security contributions for revenue than developed countries; the corporate income tax, 
VAT, turnover taxes, and other business taxes collectively represent a much greater portion of 
                                                 
173 Robinson & Slemrod, supra note 171, analyze only income tax administration. The wide adoption of the VAT, 
and the dominance of VAT revenue over not only personal but also corporate income tax revenue in many 
developing countries, would further strengthen the quoted observation. See IMF, supra note 2. 
174 See, e.g., IMF, REVENUE MOBILIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/030811.pdf, at 31 (receipts from the person income tax in developing 
countries come almost entirely from wage withholding on large enterprises and public sector employees), and at 41 
(advance collection on imports is common in Africa).   
175 See Gordon & Li, supra note 40 (hypothesizing that low levels of financial development substantially determine 
the tax structures of developing countries); Jensen, supra note 40 (showing limited size of formal employment 
sectors in developing countries); and the discussion in Part II.D supra.   
176 See Part III.A-B supra.  
177 See Part III.C supra.  
178 See Part III.B supra. Carrillo et al, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., argue that in developing 
countries, TPIR may be ineffective due to its incompleteness, and taxpayers can always evade on the margins that 
are hard for the government to verify. They thereby imply that this is not the case in developed countries, which is 
incorrect. 
179 Developing countries may make less use of TPIR as opposed to withholding, insofar as their governments are 
less likely to make non-observable characteristics of taxpayers determinative of tax liabilities. See text 
accompanying notes 69-72 supra. 
180 See Part I supra.  
181 See especially Part II.B. supra.  
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the tax take.182 One could thus say that business firms are the main source of revenue for 
developing countries. What, then, differentiates between tax administrations in poorer and in 
richer countries—what, from the perspective of law enforcement and compliance, explains the 
striking difference among them captured by political economists?183 
 
 This Article has suggested the following answer. The growth of business firms in 
developed countries has been closely intertwined with the regulatory state, in that the latter has 
played a crucial role in facilitating the division of economic profit within business firms. Within 
the institution of the modern firm, rational, self-interested individuals are able to engage 
profitably in a whole range of economic cooperation, in key part because they can rely on 
regulatory mechanisms to ensure that the benefits of cooperation are divided in ways that are 
bargained for. For this reason, participants in the firm are often willing to commit resources to 
compliance with regulations and the law in general. This dynamic has evolved to a point that 
firms generally do not consider non-compliance with tax law as their default option: after all, the 
tax law is generally enacted and enforced by the same governments that have enacted and 
enforce the other legal rules which are crucial to the cohesion of firms. What distinguishes richer 
and poor countries, therefore, is that in the former there are more firms that operate in this mode, 
both because of the greater development of markets and because of the deeper involvement of 
governments in sustaining these markets.   
 
 Such an analysis clearly implies that the effectiveness of tax administration depends on 
exogenous factors—factors that fall outside tax administrators’ control. Improving tax 
administration must of necessity be viewed in a holistic manner. While information gathering 
and enforcement aimed at producing deterrence are always important, tax collection will also 
inevitably be a matter of relying on, contributing to, and, importantly, not disruptive of social 
cooperation centered on business firms that is ordered by legal and regulatory systems. 
Deterrence cannot substitute for voluntary compliance. Therefore one must be cautious about 
adopting any instrument of deterrence if it would undermine voluntary compliance.184 This 
provides new support to the idea that rule of law norms are important to tax administration.185    
B. Implications for the U.S. and Other Developed Countries  
 
Third-party information reporting, only to a slightly lesser extent than withholding, has 
become a deeply entrenched feature of personal income tax administration in the United States 
and other advanced economies.186 The expansion of TPIR in the U.S. in 2010 to include broker 
reporting of the tax basis of securities and credit-card and electronic settlements of merchants,187 
                                                 
182 Richard Bird & Eric Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in 
Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005); Gordon & Li, supra note 40.   
183 See sources cited in note 32 supra and Figure 1.  
184 Another way of putting this is that the chief lesson, for tax administrators, from the investigation of the 
institutional foundations of modern taxation is not so much about what to do as it is about what not to do. 
185 See EVANS ET AL (EDS.),  THE DELICATE BALANCE: TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011); Wei Cui, 
Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance: A Transactional Cost Perspective, 65 U. TORONTO LAW J. 
186 (2015) (providing an account of how tax collection may proceed in the absence of voluntary compliance and the 
distortions to tax policy this generates).   
186 See generally, RETURN-FREE SYSTEMS, supra note 58. 
187 See notes 18-20 supra.  
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although still largely unrivaled by other countries, is not altogether surprising. Not only do the 
costs of the new reporting requirements now seem acceptable and not overly onerous, the 
issuance of 1099-Ks and similar forms will likely to be embraced by an ever-growing population 
of taxpayers, as the forms help taxpayers to keep clear records and thereby reduce compliance 
costs.188     
 
None of the arguments in this Article is meant to suggest that the U.S. should roll back 
any specific type of TPIR that it currently adopts, or to deny that TPIR may have assorted 
benefits for taxpayers. Nor do I advocate against any specific way of expanding the scope of 
TPIR. If the arguments in Part III.B are correct, there are likely to be natural limits of TPIR, 
expansion beyond which may generate substantial jumps in compliance costs. But the magnitude 
of such costs will clearly depend on the technologies available. If, for example, few American 
consumers and businesses use in the cash or even credit cards in the future, but instead rely on 
newer technologies (such as Blockchain) to execute payments, it may be that even instantaneous 
transactions will begin to leave digital trails that would identify the transacting parties and the 
amount and nature of transactions. Should the IRS want to collect such information to limit 
under-reporting of business income by self-employed individuals, it would probably be able to 
do so more easily (and with less political resistance) than today. 
 
But such speculations about how future technology might reduce tax evasion are 
misguided, for at least two (related) reasons. First, it is highly likely that new technologies will 
transform markets and economies, leading to substantial changes in the tax policy instruments 
that societies adopt. In other words, the main tax bases in future economies will likely be 
different from the tax bases today.189 To imagine how future technology might solve tax 
administration problems that exist only relative to the tax bases we have today is an odd form of 
futuristic exercise. Second, unless technology by itself could guarantee large-scale social 
cooperation, it seems implausible to imagine that in future societies there will not be criminals, 
free-riders, and norm violators. Presumably, technologies are developed to enable most 
cooperative humans to reap greater cooperative gains. They are not designed to make non-
cooperation impossible. Therefore, criminal and free-riders will find new ways to cheat, and it 
will be completely irrelevant that they cannot cheat by exactly the same means as they do today.   
 
Overall, that is, tax administration in the future (for those who care to think about it) will 
depend on a wide range of social institutions and circumstances, just as, as this Article has 
argued, 20th century taxation has relied on the business firm and modern regulatory law. To 
improve tax administration today, one need to better understand what are the most relevant 
factors determining compliance today. This Article has arguably suggested a very different 
direction in which to look from prior scholarship.   
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
188 See Oei & Ring, supra note 19.  
189 As some obvious examples: capital gains taxation may be replaced by mark-to-market income taxation. Better 
information about behavioral patterns of individuals may also lead to new forms of excise taxation.  
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The arguments of this Article aim to enable one to see how modern governments can 
practice “taxation without information”. This is exactly the opposite of how some recent political 
economy scholarship (and much conventional wisdom within legal scholarship) suggests to be 
the basic logic of modern taxation.190 With no institutional foundation, it may be true that there 
can be “no taxation without information”.191 But modern taxation is precisely not devoid of 
institutional foundation. The co-evolution of business firms and systems of regulatory law in 
industrial economies is likely to have laid very robust foundations for compliance with the law, 
which enabled the United States and many countries to quickly increase their levels of taxation 
in the 20th century, sometimes within the space of a few years,192 at a time when modern 
computing technology was still at its infancy.   
 
Modern taxation involves massive social cooperation: governments are put in place on 
the basis of systematic transfers of wealth. The deterrence model of tax compliance purports to 
explain taxpayers’ participation in such social enterprise by how they might be punished for free-
riding. If social cooperation in general can be explained simply by reference to how free-riders 
are deterred, the social sciences would be in a very different place from where they stand 
today.193 Conversely, if the emergence of social cooperation in human societies cannot be 
explained by simple detection and punishment mechanisms, it is not clear why government and 
taxation should constitute an exception. From this perspective, the Allingham and Sandmo 
theory of tax compliance is clearly inadequate, as is the insistence that recognizing the role of 
third-party information reporting would salvage the Allingham and Sandmo model. But merely 
identifying psychological attitudes that characterize normal, compliant taxpayers in advanced 
economies also does not do justice to the historical, cross-country, and even within-country 
variations in the level of tax compliance. The understanding of tax compliance—and arguably of 
compliance with modern regulatory law in general—must be more firmly grounded in the 
understanding of a wider range of institutions.   
 
                                                 
190 See sources cited in notes 12 and 16 supra.  
191 Pomeranz, supra note 9.  
192 See Figure 2 and note 35 supra.  
193 For a recent review of the social scientific literature on human cooperation, see John E. Roemer, How we 
cooperate … perhaps (unpublished working paper, 2015), 
http://campuspress.yale.edu/johnroemer/files/2015/06/KantSurvey-uac2sm.pdf.  
